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ABSTRACT 
The fear of legal entanglements deters many school 
administrators from instituting service-learning programs in 
secondary and postsecondary schools. This paper reviews the 
legal status of students enrolled in service-learning programs 
which are required for conferral of a diploma or four-year 
degree. The effects of negligence, school codes, federal 
labor laws, worker compensation determinations and volunteer 
status on service-learners is examined. Mandatory service in 
secondary schools is discussed; and insurance, waivers and 
risk management for programs are considered. 
vi 
CHAPTER I 
SERVICE LEARNERS AND THE LAW: AN ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Service-learning is a philosophy of reciprocal learning: 
"all parties in service learning --- those serving and those 
served --- are learners and have influence in determining what 
is to be learned. 111 Using this definition, service-learning 
encompasses a wide variety of experience-based programs which 
may include career development, academic knowledge, skill 
development or some combination of these for which students 
may or may not receive compensation. 
The critical instructional value of these experience-
based programs derives from the service performance of the 
students and ''the outcomes of these activities for those off 
campus who are the recipients of the services. 112 The 
educational value for the student performing the service 
should lead to a beneficial value for the individual or group 
that is the recipient of the service and hopefully result in 
1 Timothy Stanton, Service Learning: Groping Toward a 
Definition, in Jane C. Kendall and Associates, ed., Combining 
Service and Learning: A Resource Book for Community and Public 
Service, Volume I (Raleigh, North Carolina: National Society 
for Internships and Experiential Education) 65 (1990). 
2 Id. at 66. 
1 
2 
more effective participation in the larger society for both 
the student service-provider and the recipient of the service. 
Secondary school and higher education students enrolled 
in these programs function at the tangent of two legal worlds 
the law of education and the law of labor. As subjects of 
the law of education, these students are exposed to a myriad 
of rules, regulations and policy statements from the advent of 
their expressed interest in the institution of choice through 
matriculation and unto conferral of a diploma or degree. 
Although they are expected to read, comprehend and act on and 
in accordance with these documents, many students refer to 
these materials only during periods of registration and file 
them on bookshelves without ever reading these documents 
between terms. Consequently students are not fully cognizant 
of the obligations and duties emanating from their contracts 
of enrollment, much less from any agreements arising out of 
program-imposed placements which may create employment 
relationships and subject students to yet another legal arena, 
the law of labor. 
This paper examines the legal status of the 
constituencies engaged in service-learning placements which 
are required for conferral of a diploma or degree. It 
attempts to clarify the status of the service-learner, student 
or employee, for purposes of liability, compensation and 
insurance. Because much of the law of education and the law of 
labor is based on state codes which are constructed to meet 
3 
the needs of local populations, a deliberate effort was made 
to limit this discussion to states included in the seventh 
circuit. However, a dearth of related case law in this 
circuit compelled the writer to consider judicial issues 
arising outside these jurisdictions when the legal cases 
provided interpretations germane to this inquiry. 
It is also important to note that in this paper, service-
learning refers to only those required experiences which are 
incorporated into the curriculum and is not synonymous with 
community service or volunteerism which is separate and 
distinct from course requirements. 
Procedure 
This study was initiated with a key word search using 
service and learning. After reading journal articles related 
to service and learning, the descriptors were combined and 
delimited by the term legal issues. At this point, the focus 
of the review of literature turned to law review articles. To 
better identify appropriate articles, the writer utilized the 
Index to Legal Periodicals (I.L.P.), Current Law Index 
(C.L.I.), Legal Resources Index (L.R.I.) and Current Index to 
Legal Periodicals (C.I.L.P.). Where law review articles were 
cited in court decisions, Shepard's Law Review Citations were 
used for cross referencing and to locate additional related 
readings. Other finding tools included the two major legal 
encyclopedias, American Jurisprudence 2d (Am Jur 2d) and 
4 
Corpus Juris Secundum (CJS), which were useful for concept 
development. Words and Phrases enabled the writer to create 
links between ideas when none were apparent. 
Each of the cases reported in this paper can be located 
through the West Digest Systems. Where state statutes are 
cited, they were verified by locating the statutes for the 
particular state and reading the annotated versions whenever 
possible. 
The legal analysis which follows is the final phase in a 
multi-faceted study of service-learning. The initial stages 
of the study determined: (1) the effect of tutoring on the 
tutors's related class achievement; (2) the effect of tutoring 
on the tutees; and (3) the change in the tutors' perceptions 
of the socio-economic factors that influence student learning. 
This phase of the writer's study was undertaken to determine 
the legal status of service-learners relative to the 
institutions that sponsor them and the institutions that host 
them. 
The review of literature and legal cases in Chapter II 
establish a framework for the legal relationships between 
students and their institutions in higher education and 
secondary education. An understanding of this relationship is 
germane to assignment of liability when cases arise out of 
negligence. In Chapter III the writer explores common legal 
issues which arise in several categories of service-learning. 
These include skill-based programs which often are fraught 
5 
with issues based in negligence; school codes which in some 
instances define the legal status of teachers, student 
teachers and other school personnel relative to service-
learning placements and clearly codify the student-school 
relationship in secondary education; the terms and conditions 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act which clarifies the federal 
government's interpretations of who is an employee and 
employer; Workers' Compensation Board determinations which 
shed light on who receives benefits and when; and legal 
problems related to service-learners classified as volunteers. 
Issues brought under the United States Constitution are dealt 
with in Chapter IV which examines the novel concept of 
service-learning as a form of slavery forbidden under the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Chapter V looks at insurance, waivers, 
and risk management for service-learning programs; and the 
final chapter summarizes the findings. 
CHAPTER II 
STUDENT-SCHOOL RELATIONSHIPS 
In Higher Education 
The law of higher education, still in its infancy, is 
premised on the existence of a contract of enrollment which 
defines the student-university relationship. 3 Although most 
3 Robert L. Cherry, Jr. and John P. Geary, The College 
Catalog As a Contract, 21 J.L.& Educ. 1 n.l(Winter 1992); 
Audrey Wolfson Latourette & Robert D. King, Judicial 
Intervention in the Student-University Relationship: Due 
Process and Contract Theories, 65 U.Det.L.Rev. 199(1988); 
David Davenport, The Catalog in the Courtroom: From Shield to 
Sword? 12 J.C.& U.L. 201 n.2 (1985); Victoria J. Dodd, The 
Non-contractual Nature of the Student-University Contractual 
Relationship, 33 Kan.L.Rev. 702 (1985); Donald L. Reidhaar, 
Assault on the Citadel: Reflections on a Quarter Century of 
Change in the Relationships Between the Student and the 
University, 12 J.C.& U.L. 343 (Winter 1985); Eileen K. 
Jennings, Breach of Contract Suits by Students Against Post-
secondary Education Institutions: Can They Succeed? 7 J.C.& 
U.L. 191n.3-4 (1980 1981); Virginia Davis Nordin, The 
Contract to Educate: Toward a More Workable Theory of the 
Student-University Relationship, 8 J.C.& U.L. 141n.2 (1980-
1982) for discussion of five other theories of student-
university relationships (i.e.: constitutional analysis, 'in 
loco parentis', fiduciary theory, theory of privilege, and 
status of private association law); L. Ray, Toward Contractual 
Rights for College Students, 10 J.L.& Educ. 163 (1981); 
William G. Millington, The Law and the College Student: 
Justice in Evolution 12 - 13 (1979); Douglas J. Drushal, 
Comment, Consumer Protection and Higher Education-Student 
Suits Against Schools, 37 Ohio St.L.J. 608 (1976); Samuel K. 
Bell, Case Notes, Contracts Paynter v. N. Y. U.: How 
Discretionary are the Inherent Powers of Universities? XXI 
DePaul L.Rev. 861 (1972); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ. 231 
N.Y.S. 435 (1928), 224 App. Div. 487, 130 Misc. Rep. 249, 223 
N.Y.S. 796; Johnson v. Lincoln Christian College, 150 Ill. 
(continued ... ) 
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courts since the late nineteenth century have construed the 
student-university relationship as contractual 4 , an 
examination of relevant court cases reveals a notable lack of 
agreement on almost any application of contract law. 5 Still 
3 ( ••• continued) 
App. 3d 733 (1986); Steinberg v. Chicago Medical Sch. 41 Ill. 
App. 3d 804 (1976), 69 Ill.2d 320 (1977) 371 NE 2d 634 (Ill. 
1977), Wilson v. Ill. Benedictine College 112 Ill. App. 3d. 
932 (1983). 
4 Douglas Drushal, Comment, Consumer Protection and 
Higher Education---Student Suits Against Schools, 37 Ohio 
St.L.J. 608 at 612 (citing State ex re. Stallard v. White, 82 
Ind. 278 (1882) as one of the earliest contract cases in 
American higher education). 
5 For offer and acceptance: compare Steinberg v.Chicago 
Medical School, 69 Ill. 2d 320, 329-30, 371 N.E.2d 634, 639 
(1977); People ex rel Tinkoff v. Northwestern Univ., 333 Ill. 
App. App. 224, 232, 77 N.E. 2d 345, 349 (1947), cert. denied, 
335 U.S. 829 (1948); Niedermeyer v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 
61 Mo. App. 654, 657 (Kan. City App. 1895); Cazenovia College 
v. Patterson, 45 A.D. 2d 501, 5012 360 N.Y.S.2d 84, 86 (1974); 
Silver v. Queens College, 63 Misc. 2d 186; 311 N.Y.S.2d 313, 
314 (N.Y.C. Civ.Ct. 1970). 
For duration of contract: compare Koblitz v. Western 
Reserve Univ., 11 Ohio C.C. 515,21 Ohio Cir. Dec. 144 (1901) 
with Peretti v. Montana, 464 F.Supp. 784 (D. Mont. 1979); 
Eisele v. Ayers, 63 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 381 N.E. 2d 21 (1978); 
Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 
589 (1901); Niedermeyer v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 61 Mo. 
App. 654 (Kan. City App. 1895); Eden v. Board of Trustees, 49 
A.D.2d 277, 374 N.Y. S.2d 686 (1975); Galton v. College of 
Pharmaceutical Sciences, 70 Misc. 2d 12, 332 N.Y.S. 2d 909 
(Sup. Ct. 1972); Samson v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 101 
Misc. 146, 167 N.Y.S. 202 (Sup.Ct.) aff'd, 181 A.D. 936, 167 
N.Y.S. 1125 (1917); Horner School v. Wescott, 124 N.C. 518, 32 
S.E. 885 (1899); Behrend v. State, 55 Ohio App. 2d 135, 379 
N.E.2d 617 (1977). 
For nature of contract: compare Drucker v. New York 
Univ., 59 Misc. 2d 789, 790, 300 N.Y.S. 2d 749, 751 (App. Term 
1969), aff'd, 308 N.Y.S.2d 644 (App. Div. 1970); Miami 
Military Inst. v. Leff, 129 Misc. 481, 220 N.Y.S. 799 (Buffalo 
City Ct. 1926); Kabus v. Seftner, 34 Misc. 538, 540, 69 N.Y.S. 
983, 984 (App. Term 1901) with Cazenovia College v. Patterson, 
45 A.D. 2d 501, 503, 360 N.Y.S. 2d 84, 87 (1974). 
(continued ... ) 
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contract analogy remains the favored approach for dispute 
resolution between students and private colleges, 6 and 
occasionally it applies to public colleges also. 7 Moreover, 
courts currently disallow rigid application of contract law 
because of the uniqueness of the student-university 
relationship. 8 
As more flexible interpretations of contract law gained 
acceptance, the complexity of the contract increased and its 
ambit was expanded to include numerous published institutional 
sources and the oral representations of faculty and other 
university representatives. 9 Gradually implied-in-law 
5 ( ••• continued) 
For discussion of catalog provisions: Drucker v. New York 
Univ., 57 Misc. 2d 937, 293 N.Y.S. Civ.Ct. 1968, rev'd 59 
Misc. 2d 789, 300 N.Y.S. 2d 749 (App. Term 1969), aff'd 308 
N.Y.S. 2d 644 (App. Div. 1970). 
6 Samuel Bell, Contracts---Paynter v. New York 
University: How Discretionary Are the Inherent Powers of 
Universities, XXI DePaul L. Rev.861 (1972) at 869 stating that 
students attend private institutions under strictly 
contractual agreements. 
7 See Anderson v Regents of University of California, 22 
Cal App 3d 763, 99 Cal Rptr 531 (1972). 
8 Slaughter v. Brigham Young University, 514 F.2d 622, 
626 (1975) stating "some elements of the law of contracts are 
used and should be used in the analysis of the relationship 
between plaintiff and university to provide some framework 
into which to put the problem ... This does not mean that 
'contract law' must be rigidly applied in all its 
aspects ... The student-university relationship is unique, and 
it should not be stuffed into one doctrinal category. It may 
also be different at different schools." 
9 David Davenport, The Catalog in the Courtroom: From 
Sheild to Sword? 12 J.C.U.L. 2:201, 202 (1985). 
9 
contracts10 emerged as the "dominant concept" in court 
decisions. 11 However, these contracts, prepared by the 
school (the dominant party) to be signed by the student (the 
weaker party) who has no voice in the terms, manifest as 
contracts of adhesion when utilized by students in suits 
against their universities. 
With full knowledge of the unequal relationship between 
the parties, courts continue to analyze cases under a variety 
of legal theories12 displaying a distinct preference for 
contract theory. Judgements of these courts represent "a 
remarkably solid common law tradition favoring institutional 
discretion." 13 The only undisputed legal principle emanating 
from these decisions acknowledges students and their 
institutions as parties to a somewhat amorphous higher 
education contract. 
10 Black, at 135 stating that one of the reasons for an 
implied-in-law contract is "because of some special 
relationship between [the parties] 11 
11 Virginia Davis Nordin, The Con tract to Educate: 
Toward a More Workable Theory of the Student-University 
Relationship, 8 J.C.U.L. 2:141, 179 (1980-81). 
12 Audrey Wolfson Latourette and Robert D. King, Judicial 
Intervention in the Student-University Relationship: Due 
Process and Contract Theories, 65 U.Det.L.R. 199, 234 (1988) 
addressing contract theory as the most pervasive theory among 
four theories which courts utilize for analysis of the 
student-university relationship; see also Virginia Davis 
Nordin, The Contract to Educate: Toward a More Workable 
Theory of the Student-University Relationship, 8 J.C.U.L. 
2:141, 143n.5 (1980 -82) describing six theories of student 
university relationships. 
13 Laura Krugman Ray, Toward Contractual Rights for 
College Students, 10 J.L. & Educ. 163, 163 (1981). 
10 
Case law defines a contract as "an agreement between 
competent parties, upon consideration sufficient in law, to do 
or not to do a particular thing." 1 4 Though the college or 
university catalog is not labelled a contract and the parties 
don't sign it, the catalog represents the nucleus of the 
agreement between a university and its students. 15 In courts 
the catalog signifies the legal document which apprises 
students of an institution's course offerings, admissions 
requirements, pertinent financial aid and registration 
information, and the rules and regulations which govern 
academic and disciplinary matters. 
As a contract the catalog creates duties for the 
institution and its enrolled students . 16 Duties, commonly 
referred to as tort obligations, are created by law, separate 
from the expressed or implied intentions of the parties to a 
contract. 17 When these duties are arbitrarily disregarded, 
they may be judicially enforced as a consequence of an action 
14 People v. Drummer (1916), 274 Ill. 637, 640 as cited 
in Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill. 2d 320, 329 
(Dec. 1977). 
15 See supra note 3; also recall that contract terms 
could work in favor of either party, school or student, as 
could terms of the contract that are nowhere spelled out 
explicitly but are understood by most people associated with 
higher education or a particular educational institution. 
16 DeMarco v. University Health Sciences (1976), 40 Ill. 
App.3d 474, 480 discussing contract in relations to a private 
institution. 
17 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law 
of Torts, sec. 92 at 656 (5th ed. 1984). 
11 
based in tort . 18 
Tort is derived from the Latin word "tort us, " which 
means " a twisting" 19 • When applied to conduct, tort refers 
to improper or crooked conduct . 20 Defined broadly, a tort 
becomes a civil wrong other than a breach of contract 21 for 
which a court will provide a remedy. The remedy may be an 
action for damages, al though other remedies may also be 
available. 22 To discourage interference with the interest of 
a service-learner, an educational institution, or any other 
legal entity that is entitled to legal protection, the law 
imposes tort obligations. 23 
18 Id. 
19 E.A. Andrews, ed. Harpers' 
Latin Dictionary. Founded on the 
Latin= German Lexicon. Revised by 
and Charles Short, LL.D. (New York: 
1907) at 1880c. 
Latin Dictionary: A New 
translation of Freund' s 
Charlton T Lewis, Ph.D. 
American Book Company, 
20 Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. Krause, and Alfred W. 
Gans, The American Law of Torts (1983) sec. 1:20 defining tort 
as a "breach of duty imposed either by statute or by case law 
and not by contract." 
21 See Prosser stating that "Contract liability is 
imposed by the law for the protection of a single, limited 
interest, that of having the promises of others performed. 
Quasi-contractual liability is created for the prevention of 
unjust enrichment of one person at the expense of another and 
the restitution of benefits which in good conscience belong to 
the plaintiff;" see also Speiser et al. , supra note 1 7 
indicating that a contract breach arises from agreement of the 
parties whereas a tort is a violation of a duty which is fixed 
by law independent of a contract or the will of the parties. 
22 W. Page Keeton et al.,Prosser and Keeton on the Law 
of Torts,at 4 (5th ed. 1984). 
23 Id., sec. 92 at 656; see also supra notes 17, 18. 
12 
Because tort obligations or duties are created primarily 
on the basis of public policy reasons, 24 liability in tort 
actions stems from conduct against public policy, conduct 
which is socially unreasonable. 25 As noted above, the law 
entitles a student to protection for duties which are not 
upheld. This protection is a manifestation that the policy 
reflected in a given situation has received consideration. 26 
In the current milieu of higher education, some courts do 
not recognize any university duty to students. This 
interpretation flows from the decisions in Bradsha-..v2 7 and 
Rabel28 in which both courts preconditioned the imposition of 
24 Id., sec.92 at 655. 
25 Id. at 6; see also Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, 
Jr., & Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts (second Ed.) Vol. 3 
(1986) sec.16.1 stating that negligence is unreasonably 
dangerous conduct which whether by act or by omission of an 
act must be voluntary (e.g. not premeditated) and exists under 
two theories: (1) conduct theory which if respected in a 
court of law would exclude as irrelevant evidence introduced 
to show an actor's state of mind and (2) state of mind theory 
which if accepted tends to appropriate a closer correspondence 
between legal liability and the moral culpability of the actor 
and requires a finding of indifference or inadvertence or that 
anxious care precluded the negligence. 
26 W. Prosser, Torts, sec. 20, 53 (1971). 
27 Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138-140 (3rd Cir. 
1979) discussing society's acceptance of the college student 
as an adult as changing the relationships which underlie tort 
analysis in student-university suits in the context of student 
activities. 
28 Rabel v. Ill. Wesleyan University, 161 Ill. App. 3d 
348, 359 (1987) stating that "[f] or purposes of examining 
fundamental relationships that underlie tort liability, 
competing interests of student and institution of higher 
learning are much different today than they were in the 
(continued ... ) 
13 
a duty upon a university to act with reasonable care for the 
safety of its students on the existence of a custodial 
relationship between a student and the university. Applying 
the reasoning of Bradshaw and Rabel, since a college no longer 
stands "in loco parentis" to its students, its duty 
recedes. 29 Courts which accept this line of reasoning 
recognize no duty of care by a college/university to its 
students. This perspective is tenuous. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates a special 
relationship can give rise to duty in the absence of 
11 custody. 1130 Since the law recognizes the relationship 
between colleges and their students as unique, 31 then by 
definition this relationship is special and therefore can give 
rise to duty. Furthermore, 11 ••• the law appears ... to be 
working slowly toward a recognition of the duty to aid or 
protect in any relation of dependence or mutual 
dependence. 11 32 
For an action in tort to be successful the factual 
setting must be proper. That an institution has a duty to 
28 ( ••• continued) 
past ... the change has occurred because society considers the 
modern college student an adult, not a child of tender years. 11 
29 See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138-140 (3rd 
Cir.1979). 
30 
31 
32 
Restatement, sec. 314-328. 
Slaughter, 514 F.2d 622, 626. 
Restatement, sec. 314A, comment(b) 
14 
prevent a service-learner from exposure to unreasonable harm 
must be established under the law or by fact. While duty may 
be plausible in the context of the student-university 
relationship, it may be difficult to sustain because no widely 
accepted test exists to prove the existence of duty. 33 It is 
determined by whether a student is deserving of legal 
protection; 34 and as noted earlier, duty is premised on 
considerations of public policy which lead the law to say a 
particular learner is entitled to protection. 35 
Once it is established that a duty exists, it must be 
shown that the institution failed to conform to standards of 
care provided by other institutions in similar 
circumstances. 36 Next the service-learner must prove that 
the university, through its agents, acted unreasonably; and 
these unreasonable actions exposed the student to undue risk 
of harm. For tort based on negligence to exist, this 
connection must be substantiated. 
Finally, a causal relationship must be established 
between the injury the learner experiences and the misconduct 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Drushal, supra note 2, at 619. 
Keeton et al., supra note 21, sec.92. 
Id. at sec. 53. 
Id. at sec. 30 - 33. 
15 
perpetrated by the institution. 37 In other words, it must be 
shown that the injury suffered or the loss experienced was a 
result of the institutions's misconduct and that· this 
misconduct was the proximate cause38 of the harm to the 
student. 39 
Non-contractual suits involving service-learning which 
are brought against post-secondary degree-granting 
institutions most likely would be founded on negligence 
because service-learning requirements in the context of 
education encompass programs which involve experience-based or 
field-based components. Programs with these components may 
require complex arrangements to provide adequate supervision 
for university students as well as protection for receiving 
and sending institutions and third party recipients of 
services. 
In Secondary Schools 
While the law of higher education continues to evolve 
37 It is usually the responsibility of a jury to 
determine what precautions are appropriate to the harm at 
issue. 
38 See Roberts v. Robertson County Board of Education, 
692 S. W. 2d 870 qouting from the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
that proximate cause is "an act or omission occurring or 
concurring with another which, if it had not happened, the 
injury would not have been inflicted;" and that the proximate 
cause need not be the sole nor last cause of injury nor the 
only cause and that recovery from multiple parties separately 
or jointly is possible. 
39 Keeton et al., supra note 121 at sec. 30. 
16 
premised upon the existence of a contract between the student 
and the institution, the law of public education as applied to 
legal issues originating in lower schools accepts the student-
institution relationship as "in loco parentis." 
contracts control (typically in private schools), 
Where 
they 
generally are viewed as quasi-contracts; and actions in tort 
at this level of education usually are rooted in negligence 
premised on lack of or improper supervision. 
As in higher education, service-learning in secondary 
schools presents problems which may be spawned by joint 
venture control or aberration of control with an intent to 
shift liability by one of the parties, lack of clear 
delineations of responsibilities and rights between and among 
the parties, or unclear legal theories in the area of school 
law. At all levels of education, context and circumstance 
bear directly upon the issues. However, the ages of students 
are of particular significance to the circumstances bearing 
upon legal issues which originate in secondary schools. 
Consequently in these arenas, rights of students may be 
truncated as the responsibilities of faculty, staff and 
administration for control and supervision may be increased. 
As early as 1905 the Supreme Court began hearing cases 
related to student rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
that year, it affirmed the right of a state to require all 
17 
community inhabitants to be vaccinated. 40 By 1922 the Court 
had affirmed the right of a city to require vaccination as a 
condition of enrollment in public and private schools. 41 As 
the boundaries of students' rights evolved, other courts 
recognized the validity of compulsory school attendance 
statutes. 42 Although immunization statutes and compulsory 
attendance laws had been affirmed, required participation in 
activities which conflict with students' ideological positions 
or denial of a right to engage in activities which affirm 
their ideological beliefs resulted in mixed outcomes until the 
1943 Barnette decision disallowing required participation in 
the flag pledge and salute at the risk of punishment or 
expulsion43 and indicating that a state law which impinges 
139 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.11 (1905) holding that 
a board of health had the right to require all community 
inhabitants to be immunized and exempt those children who for 
medical reasons could not withstand vaccination. 
41 Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922). 
42 See Scoma v. Chicago Board of Education, 391 F. Supp. 
452 (N.D. Ill 1924). 
43 Compare Minerville School District v. Gobi tis, 310 
U.S. 586 (1940) (finding a mandatory flag salute 
constitutional) with Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 
(1943) (holding it unconstitutional for a state to punish 
those who for religious convictions urge and even advise 
others not to salute the national and state flags) and West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943) (holding that students who refuse to salute and pledge 
allegiance to the flag may not be suspended or expelled from 
school) which effectively overruled the Court's decision in 
Gobitis three years earlier; see also Sherman v. Community 
Consolidated District 21 of Wheeling Township, 714 F. Supp. 
932 (N.D.Ill. 1989) for a recent case where a student who 
objected to the Pledge of Allegiance on religious grounds 
stated a cause for action. 
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upon Constitutional rights will be sustained only if the state 
law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 
However, by the late 1960s and into the early 1970s 
student challenges to the First and Fourteenth Amendment had 
progressed from issues centered on required participation to 
limitations on protected expressive conduct which the Supreme 
Court determined as subject for strict scrutiny. 44 Later in 
the decade, under certain conditions daytime school attendance 
in at least one state could be used as a predictable and 
economical basis for determining ineligibility for 
unemployment benefits for otherwise eligible persons without 
violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, this same statute did not assign 
ineligibility status on otherwise eligible night school 
attendees. 45 
During the 80s, the Supreme Court determined that school 
officials could discipline students for speech which was 
plainly offensive to students and teachers. Where in 1943 
44 See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District 393 U.S. 503 (1969) for a case in public school 
secondary education which held that disciplining students for 
peaceful wearing of armbands, the issue in this case, or other 
peaceful symbolic expression of opinion was unconstitutional 
unless it could be shown that material disruption or 
substantial interference with the educational process did or 
would result; see also Heady v James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) for 
a case in higher education that extended the Tinker decision 
to the associational rights of college students. 
45 Idaho Department of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100 
( 1977) 
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students in Taylor 46 were granted the right to advocate for 
their religious beliefs which were not found subversive to 
government, the Court now balanced students' rights to 
advocate unpopular and controversial views against the 
school's interest in teaching students the fundamental values 
of the community which included socially acceptable behavior. 
Because some students in secondary schools are minors, the 
Court based its opinion on precedent that valued protecting 
minors from exposure to language identified as vulgar and 
offensive. 47 
The Court further bounded the school's authority to limit 
the expressive conduct of its students when in 1988 it was 
asked to determine the extent of a principal's authority to 
edit the content of a school newspaper written and produced as 
part of a journalism class. 48 Using Tinker49 and Fraser5°, 
the Court identified the public school as a special context 
for the First Amendment and determined that schools need not 
tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with the basic 
purposes of public school education as long as the speech 
46 Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943). 
47 See Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 
(1986). 
48 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 
(1988) . 
49 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
50 Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
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occurs as part of the school curriculum or in an activity 
sponsored by the school . 51 The Court also distinguished 
between truncated expressive conduct permissible in a 
classroom forum and the 11 wider latitude" accorded speech in a 
public forum which includes student government as a segment of 
the public. Furthermore no clear-cut rule emerged to delineate 
when public school programs conflict with parental rights; 52 
and currently no case law designates education a fundamental 
right. Consequently only a common law right continues to 
51 For a discussion of the First Amendment rights of 
students in relationship to library materials, see Board of 
Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. 
Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (indicating that while school boards 
have broad discretion in controlling library content, when 
materials proven to have educational value are removed because 
the board disagrees with the content and acts to impose its 
own point of view the act of removing the materials violates 
students' First Amendment rights); see also Pratt v. 
Independent School District Number 831, Forest Lake, 670 F.2d 
771 ( 8th Cir. 1982) (declaring unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment a board's decision to remove a certain film 
from the high school curriculum based on the board's 
ideology) . 
52 Compare Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925) (stating that a state may require school attendance and 
while it may not restrict that attendance to only public 
institutions, it may regulate all schools within reason) which 
premised its holding in part on the Fourteenth Amendment 
protection of persons from arbitrary state action impairing 
parents' liberty interest to direct the education of their 
children with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (stating 
that compulsory secondary school attendance cannot be imposed 
on parents in an Amish community where this requirement will 
display a detrimental effect on a way of life in which 
religious belief and practice are inseparable from daily 
living which has been shown to produce responsible, self-
sufficient citizens) which based its holding on the free 
exercise clause of the First Amendment; both cases while 
protecting parents' rights to direct the education of their 
children find their support in different Amendments because 
the issues were presented from different perspectives. 
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exist for parents to excuse their off spring from certain 
classes when they raise objections based on a values conflict. 
Mandating community service in secondary schools has raised 
such objections. 
CHAPTER III 
LEGAL ISSUES IN SERVICE-LEARNING PROGRAMS 
Negligence 
The term negligence, as used in court cases, may cause 
confusion because of its dual meanings. Often negligence is 
defined as a tort characterized by four previously described 
elements: ( 1) Z owes a duty of reasonable care to Y; ( 2) A 
breach of that duty occurs; (3) Y receives injury or harm; and 
(4) The harm or injury to Y results from the breach of duty by 
z. When a student or group of students bringing a tort claim 
based in negligence proves each of these conditions, damages 
may be awarded. 
However, in a more restrictive sense, negligence means a 
breach of duty, the failure to live up to the standard of 
expected care. This is the second element of a tort claim 
based in negligent conduct. A student alleging that a faculty 
member or other school employee or a legal entity "is 
negligent" means that the named person or group failed to 
exercise appropriate care under the circumstances. What 
constitutes appropriate care is a question of fact for a court 
of law to determine. 
Liability for the tort of negligence is contingent on the 
negligent conduct causing injury. However, a teacher may be 
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negligent without being liable for negligence. To comprehend 
this concept, it is important to differentiate between the 
tort of negligence (see par. 1 above) and the more limited 
concept of negligence, the breach of the duty of reasonable 
care (see par. 2 above). Court cases seldom distinguish these 
two concepts of negligence. 
The duty of reasonable care may give rise to further 
confusion. It does not require a teacher to avoid all injury 
to a student. Instead, the duty of reasonable care only 
compels that a teacher avoids injuring a student or group of 
students by carelessness in the teacher's actions. This 
negligence may result in two ways: (1) The teacher may omit 
to act in a manner consistent with the ordinary actions of a 
reasonable person in a similar context; or (2) The teacher may 
act in a manner that a reasonable and prudent person usually 
would not act under similar circumstances. 
To illustrate the feasibility of a reasonable person, 
consider the thought process of such a teacher, a teacher who 
unfailingly chooses to act with moderation and to 
appropriately evaluate her own actions as well as the actions 
of others in everything she undertakes. Since she represents 
the incredible breadth of human experience, her relevant 
characteristics vary by situations. 
and habits of human beings ... and 
She knows the "qualities 
the characteristics and 
capacities of things and forces which are common knowledge at 
the time and in the particular community ... [as well as] the 
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common law, legislative enactments and general customs ... "that 
are likely to affect the conduct of others ... 11 including third 
parties. 53 However, her primary consideration always is 
whether her actions will impose injury on another (s) . In 
other words, she weighs the "foreseeability of the risk of 
injury" which may arise from her action. 
Just as all negligence does not impose liability, all 
acts which involve risk of harm are not necessarily so laden 
with danger that they must be avoided. Therefore before 
acting, this reasonable teacher balances the usefulness of her 
activity against its potential to harm and the extent of the 
possible risk of harm to another. Obviously, this reasonable 
person is a fictitious ideal who always makes good choices in 
her conduct. 
Court review of cases involving negligence considers the 
actions of both parties but sets the standard of reasonable 
care to protect the student(s) bringing suit, not the school 
employee(s) against whom allegations are raised. The conduct 
of the student(s) bringing suit is assessed in terms of the 
standard of care one is required to exhibit to protect 
oneself. The acts of the school employee(s) alleged to have 
breached a duty of care are assessed in terms of a reasonable 
teacher who is reasonably considerate of the safety of 
53 Restatement Second of Torts, secs. 285, 288C, 288C(a), 
290. 
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students. 54 
When a student under the age of 16 years is a party to a 
negligence action, the reasonable person standard· still 
applies. Here the conduct of the minor is compared to that of 
a reasonable person of the same age, intelligence and 
experience acting under like circumstances. The child's 
judgement is not questioned because judgement is an exercise 
of intelligence; it is not synonymous with intelligence. 
Sometimes a young child may escape liability for negligent 
acts because the law requires a young child to conform to the 
standard of the reasonable person only when the risk inherent 
in the act and the injurious character of the act are 
identifiable by a child of the same age, intelligence, and 
experience. 55 
Where adult students with mental deficiencies or physical 
disabilities are concerned, these conditions become part of 
the circumstance. Thus the conduct of adult students with 
mental deficiencies or physical disabilities is compared to 
the conduct of reasonable adult persons in the same physical 
or mental circumstances, of similar age, intelligence and 
experience. Also when a person voluntarily assists another, 
the person providing the voluntary assistance is bound to 
exercise the same degree of care that our reasonable person in 
54 
55 
Id. secs. 283(f), 291, 293. 
Id. secs. 283A, 284(b). 
the same circumstance would exhibit. 56 Awareness of 
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attributes of the reasonable person, a person of similar age, 
intelligence, experience and circumstance, raises the next 
question: How is the conduct standard of this fictitious ideal 
determined? 
The minimum standard of conduct for a reasonable person 
is determined in four ways. First, specific statutes, 
legislative mandates or administrative rules provide for the 
standard. Second, when the established standard can't be 
applied to the facts of a case, courts adopt the standard from 
enactments or regulations which do not provide for one. Third, 
appellate decisions establish the standard. Finally, where no 
standard exists, a trial judge or jury creates a standard to 
apply to the facts of a case because a conclusion was reached 
that a duty ought to exist under the circumstances. 
Should a situation arise where a reasonable person would 
take additional precautions, compliance with existing 
statutes, enactments, or regulations will not bar a finding of 
negligence because these enumerate only a minimum standard of 
reasonable care. 57 Remember, "legal duties are not 
discoverable facts of nature [. They are] conclusory 
expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability 
56 Id. secs. 283B, 283C. 
57 Id. secs. 285, 285(d), 288C, 288C(a). 
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should be imposed for damages done. 1158 
Selected Legal Cases Involving Negligence 
Now let's take a closer look at negligence in the context 
of educational institutions. In most elementary and secondary 
school cases, duty is premised on the fact that school 
officials acting "in loco parentis" possess full knowledge of 
their students' needs for protection. However, teachers of 
adult students don't stand "in loco parentis!" Furthermore, 
public school personnel engaged in teaching or supervisory 
activities usually are entitled to tort liability immunity. 
However, teacher immunity for tort liability may not 
necessarily apply in a vocational-technical school 
district. 59 The following cases illustrate various negligence 
claims against schools or school personnel arising from 
student injuries which occurred in vocational programs which 
could be classified as service-learning programs. 
In a 1990 New York case, a court found for the school 
when a learning disabled 19-year-old student was injured while 
working with lumber under the direct supervision of a company 
to which he had been assigned for work-study. He severed two 
fingers and injured a third while working with a saw with 
which he was familiar. The school asserted no duty to control 
58 Tarasoff v. The Regents of the University of 
California, 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal.1976) 
59 See 78A C.J.S.sec.470. 
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the acts of the student because the student was a legal adult 
and also because his mother, not the school, had encouraged 
his participation in the program. The trial court ruled that 
schools are not insurers of student safety, that the standard 
of reasonable care for a 19-year-old student was less 
demanding than the standard for a young child, and that there 
was no evidence that the machinery the student was using was 
unsafe. Therefore, the school was not negligent. 60 
In another instance, a high school student enrolled in a 
Missouri vocational agricultural class sustained injuries when 
a nail struck him in the eye while he and fellow classmates 
were constructing a hard oak feed bin as part of a curriculum 
proj ect 61 • The student was not wearing safety glasses; and 
the injury caused permanent loss of normal vision. On the day 
of the injury, the school district had secured liability 
insurance covering at least a portion of the damages. The 
trial court granted summary judgment to the school board, the 
district and its named employees. 
A unanimous appellate court affirmed the decision with 
respect to the school board. It noted that in Missouri, 
"purchase of liability insurance does not estop a [school 
district] from asserting the defense of sovereign 
6° Kennedy v. Waterville Cent.Dist., 555 N.Y.S.2d 224 
(Sup .1990) . 
61 Lehman v. Wansing, 624 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.bane 1981). 
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immunity. 1162 However, where a student avers that the school 
district employees named in his suit were "acting 
individually ... ," 63 the student may be trying to establish a 
cause of action for tortious conduct against each of the named 
parties. Therefore, "the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment [for the employees] based on sovereign immunity. As 
the liability of each [employee] will depend on the degree of 
care each owes in the fact situation alleged, the [students] 
may be able to plead the breach of personal duty as to each 
[employee] in [the wrongful actions or omissions of actions] 
averred. "64 Furthermore, the court indicated in a split 
decision that in situations like this, a student should be 
given an opportunity to state his precise claim against the 
school officials named in the suit. The judgment favoring the 
superintendent, principal, di vision supervisor and teacher was 
reversed and remanded. 
In a similar fact situation, a high school senior 
enrolled in the second semester of a building trades class was 
injured as he attempted to hammer a nail into a piece of 
plywood while on a house construction site. 65 He was not 
wearing safety glasses at the time of injury; and the teacher 
62 Id. at 2 citing Spearman v. University City Public 
School District, 617 S.W.2d 68, 69-70 (Mo.1981). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 3. 
65 Regulski v. Murphy, 326 N.W.2d 528 (Mich.App.) 
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left the students unsupervised at the job site for a short 
duration. The building project was part of the school 
curriculum; and when completed, it was to be sold to a private 
party. Although the student alleged causes of carelessness, 
wrongdoing, and negligence in leaving the students 
unsupervised and failing to dismiss students after the 
accident, the trial court granted summary judgment for the 
school district finding that conducting the class was part of 
the curriculum thereby entitling the district to governmental 
immunity. Furthermore, as district employees, the teacher and 
the supervisor, also, were entitled to governmental immunity. 
On appeal the question for the court, whether granting of 
summary judgment to the school district was correct, was 
affirmed based on case law, statutory law, and analogy to the 
case which established the law. 66 Resolution affirming 
summary judgment for the teacher and supervisor was achieved 
by reviewing relevant case law which indicates that in 
Michigan when teachers are engaged in teaching which is part 
of the curriculum, they are functioning in a governmental 
capacity and therefore entitled to governmental immunity for 
66 Id. at 52 9 citing Weaver v. Duff Norton Co. , 115 
Mich.App. 286, 320 N.W.2d 248 (1982) which found "that a 
public school district's operation of a vocational education 
program is a governmental function within the meaning of 
M.C.L.sec. 691.1407 and M.S.A.sec. 3.996(107), the 
governmental immunity statute" and based its holding on 
Sec.1287(1) of the School Code of 1976, M.C.L.sec. 
380.1287(1); M.S.A.sec.15.41287(1) which authorize school 
boards to establish vocational education programs and that 
vocational education is an integral part of the modern 
curriculum. 
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tort liability. 
The student appealed; and the case was reviewed by the 
Michigan Supreme Court as part of a consolidated suit 67 
examining the extent of immunity from tort liability to be 
provided to the state and its agencies, local governmental 
agencies, and the officers, agents, and employees of these 
agencies. As a result of this review, it was determined: (1) 
that since the purpose of the class was primarily educational, 
the operation of the building trades class did not expose the 
school district to tort liability for the student's eye 
injury; (2) that since the class was expressly authorized, 
proper instruction and supervision of students, including 
provision of proper safety instruction, equipment and measures 
for the protection of the students were also authorized 
expressly or impliedly, and since the employees were engaged 
in a governmental function (teaching) when the accident 
occurred, the district was entitled to immunity from tort 
liability; ( 3) that the method of daily instruction and 
supervision of students, being non-discretionary, exposed the 
teacher and program supervisor to tort liability for their 
alleged negligence in instructing, warning and supervising the 
student who was injured; (4) that determination of a school 
policy for protective eye wear, first-aid, etc. were 
"discretionary-decisional" acts for which the persons making 
67 See Ross v. 
(Mich .1984) . 
Consumers Power Co. , 363 N.W.2d 641 
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decisions were immune from tort liability; and ( 5) that 
failure to comply with school safety policies and statutory 
safety requirements for students in industrial arts classes 
exposed the teacher and program director to tort liability 
because compliance activities were ministerial functions, not 
discretionary acts. 
The above cases indicate that school districts and school 
administrators are exempt from tort liability for acts of 
policy determination such as protective eye wear policies. 
However, when teachers do not enforce school district safety 
policies, they may lose their statutorily granted immunity. 
Additionally, they may be liable for breach of statutory duty 
if the policy flows from a state mandate. 
Further clarification of the reasonable person standard 
results from the holding in Payne v. Dept. of Human Resources, 
382 S.E.2d 449 (N.C.App. 1989) in which a deaf vocational 
education student enrolled in a residential school which 
provided a school handbook to shop students brought suit 
against a teacher for negligent supervision when the student's 
injury occurred partially due to insubordination. First the 
court determined that imposing a duty on a teacher to foresee 
that a student in this circumstance would leave his assignment 
when the teacher is summoned to another area for a brief time 
would impose a burden on the teacher beyond that of reasonable 
foreseeability. 68 Second, a teacher's duty to warn a student 
68 Id. at 452. 
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about dangers is not so expansive as to require that warnings 
be given about any and all dangers that might arise in the 
situation. 69 This requirement, too, would extend beyond the 
standard of reasonable foreseeability. Finally, students are 
responsible to know the safety rules and warnings included in 
a school handbook. 70 
In an Ohio high school vocational construction class, 
students cut a hole in the floor of a community member's 
dining room as part of a class project. When class ended for 
the day, the hole was covered with insulating paper and "a 
bookcase, table, and two chairs were placed by the two exposed 
sides of the hole. 1171 Despite these precautions and a 
warning by the class instructor, the owner of the home fell 
through the hole into the basement where she was found. Later 
that night she died. 
The trial court granted the teacher immunity under Ohio 
R.C. 2744.03 (A) (6) which provides immunity for political 
subdivision employees. However, the daughter of the decedent 
appealed based on the exception in R.C. 2744.03 (A) (6) (b) which 
does not grant immunity if the employee's "acts or omissions 
were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or 
69 
70 
Id. at 453. 
Id. 
71 Hackathorne v. Preisse, 661 N.E.2d 384, 385 (Ohio 
App.9 Dist. 1995) 
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reckless manner." 72 Although the teacher did not abide by the 
applicable building codes, which the family of the decedent 
thought should have been done, the appellate court based the 
determination on foreseeability and ruled that in light of the 
other precautions taken the teacher's conduct did not rise to 
the level of maliciousness, wantonness or recklessness. He 
further noted that even though the parties differed in their 
views of the level of the teacher's fault, assignment of the 
level of culpability is a legal conclusion for the court to 
determine, not a statement of fact to be presented by either 
of the parties. 
Roberts v. Robertson County Board of Education73 
provided an extended explanation of duty in an educational 
setting. In defining duty under Tennessee law, the court 
noted that teachers and school districts are not insurers of 
students; and teachers are not expected to supervise students 
in all their activities at all times. Furthermore, the court 
noted that in other jurisdictions where injuries to students 
in shop classes were considered, "teachers, and through them 
their local school systems, are required to exercise such care 
as ordinarily reasonable and prudent persons would exercise 
under the same or similar circumstances." [citations omitted] 
Furthermore the reasonable person standard adopted in 
other Tennessee cases involving safety relates the standard to 
72 
73 
Id. at 386. 
692 S.W.2d 870 
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the nature of the person to whom duty is owed and the context 
in which the duty arises. 74 Acting upon these precedents, 
the court ruled that a "high school vocational teacher has the 
duty to take those precautions that any ordinarily reasonable 
and prudent person would take to protect his shop students 
from the unreasonable risk of injury. The extent of these 
precautions must be determined with reference to the age and 
inexperience of the students involved, their less than mature 
judgment with regard to their conduct and the inherently 
dangerous nature of the power driven equipment available for 
their use in the shop. In order to discharge this duty, it is 
incumbent upon a teacher, at minimum, to instruct his students 
in the safe and proper use of the equipment, to warn the 
students of known dangers, and to supervise the students to 
the extent necessary for the enforcement of adequate rules of 
shop safety. 11 
Quoting from the Supreme Court of Tennessee, proximate 
cause is "an act or omission occurring or concurring with 
another which, if it had not happened, the injury would not 
have been inflicted." It does not have to be the sole or last 
cause for the injury, and there can be more than one cause for 
an injury. It is also possible to recover from multiple 
74 Roberts, 692 S.W.2d at 870 citing Hawkins County v. 
Davis, 216 Tenn. 262, 267, 391 S.W.2d 658, 660 (1965) and 
Townsley v. Yellow cab Co., 145 Tenn.App. 425,m 454-455, 222 
S.W.2d 854, 867 (1968). 
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parties separately or jointly. 75 
In Illinois it has been established that a shop teacher's 
control over his students is not the same as that in an 
employer-employee relationship. When a decedent student's 
estate brought an appeal based on respondeat superior76 , the 
appellate court indicated that the difference in the 
relationship was sufficient for the appeal to fail. For the 
suit to have succeeded, the actions of the teacher would have 
to have been wilful or wanton. 
Since the claim against the district alleged only 
incompetence or failure to act, the lower court had properly 
dismissed the suit in which death resulted from an 
unauthorized student being thrown to the pavement while riding 
the hood of a car being driven through the school parking lot 
at high speed. The student driver's counter suit alleging 
contribution by the school district was also dismissed. 77 
Compare the above decision to this one in which two 
individuals perished in, or as a result of, a fire which 
originated in a defective electrical cord on a window air 
conditioner. The air conditioner had been purchased from a 
75 Id. 
76 Respondea t superior is a "common law doctrine which 
holds the master or principal liable for the employee's or 
agent's" reasonable and foreseeable actions (including torts) 
that an employee "engages in while carrying out the employer's 
business." (Black's Law Dictionary, Pocket Edition 1996 at 546 
and 564) 
77 Knapp v. Hill, 627 N.E.2d 1068 (Ill.App.1st Dist.1995) 
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student at a postsecondary area vocational technical school. 
The trial court granted a judgment favoring the school and 
against the family survivors, the building management company, 
and its insurer. The parties appealed. 
A building manager advised his tenants that air 
conditioners could be purchased at the area vocational 
technical school. The students at the school repaired air 
conditioners as part of a class. The air conditioners were 
brought to the school by students or donated by others. The 
unit alleged to have caused the fire was purchased at the 
school from the student owner who had been working on it the 
time of purchase. At the time of installation the cord of the 
unit had been taped and spliced. However, there were no 
apparent problems for several months and there was no evidence 
that the resulting problems were related to the spliced 
electrical cord. Under Louisiana Civil Code Articles, the 
question on appeal was inter alia whether the school is liable 
to the survivors, the building management company and its 
insurers. 78 Since the other counts are beyond the scope of 
this paper, they will not be discussed. 
Testimony indicated that the school had a known policy 
against selling appliances at the school. Students could sell 
repaired items from their homes, but not from the school. The 
school also had an expressed policy against the use of spliced 
78 Levine v. Live Oak Masonic Housing, Inc. 491 So.2d 489 
(La.App.3 Cir. 1986). 
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electrical cords. Louisiana Civil Code Article 2320, provides 
in pertinent part: 
" ... Teachers and artisans are answerable for the damage 
caused by their scholars or apprentices, while under 
their superintendence. 
In the above cases, responsibility only attaches when the 
masters,or employers, teachers, and artisans, might have 
prevented the act which caused the damage, and have not 
done it." 
Therefore, for the instructor and school to be liable, it must 
be established that the instructor could have prevented the 
act which caused the damage if he had exercised proper care 
under the circumstances; that he failed to exercise proper 
care; that damage occurred; and that the damage was caused by 
the instructor's improper exercise of care. 
The appellate court reasoned that since the students were 
mature young men, both over 18 years, they should have been 
able to follow instructions given to them by the instructor 
without the instructor's direct supervision. Since the 
student who sold the air conditioner deliberately violated two 
school policies, both without the knowledge of the instructor, 
the instructor was free of negligence and no school liability 
resulting from the instructor's conduct existed. 79 
The above cases applying the various principles of the 
law of negligence suggest that school administrators may be 
liable for negligent supervision if it can be shown that they 
failed to exercise reasonable care in overseeing the 
79 Id. at 494. 
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development, design, and administration of a school's service-
learning curriculum or in supervising faculty and other 
personnel with responsibility for academic programs. 
Inadequate supervision of students also may expose vocational 
education administrators to tort liability. However, such 
liability may be highly subjective and limited by narrowly 
defined scope of applicable duties. 
Because teachers are nearest to students in the chain of 
liability, they may have the greatest legal responsibility for 
accidents that occur to students while they are involved in 
activities to which the teachers are assigned. Even when 
educational institutions and their officials are not held 
liable, teachers may be liable for accidents which result from 
teacher negligence. Resulting damages many times greater than 
the actual medical costs may be awarded as a result of 
liability imposed on teachers; 80 and when constitutional 
80 See McKnight v. City of Philadelphia, 445 A. 2d 778 
(Pa. Super. 1982) in which a trial court's $95,000 award to 
a student whose one finger was amputated and another severely 
injured while using a saw without a guard was affirmed by the 
appellate court which indicated that proximate cause, the 
point where legal responsibility attaches for harm to a 
student resulting from acts of a teacher, may be established 
by evidence that the teacher's negligent act or failure to act 
was a substantial factor, not the only factor, in causing harm 
to the student and that testimony by the principal who at the 
time of the accident was an administrative assistant to the 
superintendent that he knew and recognized the responsibility 
of the principal for the safety of the students and under 
ordinary circumstances everything else in the building was 
sufficient to establish that the principal's failure to 
correct the situation constituted negligence; see also Cotton 
v. Gering Pub. Schools, 511 N.W. 2d 549 (Neb. App. 
1993) (affirming a $32,000 award for damages to a student whose 
medical bills amounted to less than 10% of the award.) 
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torts against teachers are not proven, the teacher may be 
granted summary judgement and entitled to recover all court 
costs from the student plaintiff. 81 
Legal Principles Derived From Selected Cases 
In the cases reviewed above, most reached the appellate 
level because the lower courts had granted summary judgment 
for schools and their employees. The immunity from tort 
liability at the district level generally was premised in 
statutory laws designed to minimize fear of litigation for 
personnel charged with policy-making responsibilities. 
However, when an administrator violated school safety 
policies, the court recognized this violation of policy and 
found the administrator negligent for not correcting a 
dangerous situation which he knew about or should have known 
about. 82 
An appellate court is likely to affirm a trial court's 
decision against a teacher when a student is exposed to 
unreasonable risk of injury. 83 Teachers are expected to 
81 See Moore v. Port Arthur Independent School Dist., 751 
F. Supp. 671 (E.D.Tex. 1990). 
82 See McKnight, supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
83 See Barbin on Behalf of Barbin v. State, 506 So. 2d 
888 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987)awarding a deaf minor in a special 
placement who uses manual communication $185,00 in damages as 
a result of the physical and emotional harm sustained by 
cutting his right index finger longitudinally from the tip 
into the proximal interphalangeal joint while participating in 
a class under the supervision of a teacher who argued that the 
(continued ... ) 
foresee the danger in selecting activities. 
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They also are 
expected to modify the course curriculum and exclude use of 
dangerous equipment when the school district does not repair 
or replace the defective equipment. 
When an adult student brings a negligence claim against 
a teacher, the court's analysis places less emphasis on the 
conduct of the teacher and increases scrutiny of the student's 
action. Age of the student, not location of the program in a 
high school or postsecondary school, 
factor. 84 
is a determining 
vary. 
Where contribution is a factor in the decisions, holdings 
For example, in North Carolina, if evidence indicates 
beyond a doubt that a student contributed to his own injury, 
a nonsuit may be declared. 85 Some courts may reduce a 
student's award in proportion to his contribution to his own 
injury, 86 and a Louisiana court may use the student's age as 
83 ( ••• continued) 
student's momentary inattention contributed to the student's 
injury and therefor the teacher should not be considered 
negligent; the case also considers the fault of the state in 
strict liability as custodian of defective things and 
indemnity of the teacher and the insurance company, all of 
which are beyond the scope of this paper. 
84 Contrast Levine, supra note 63 (discussing an adult 
student in a postsecondary program) with Kennedy, supra note 
45 (discussing a 19-year-old student enrolled in a high school 
program) and accompanying texts. 
85 See Izard by Izard v. Hickory City Schools Board of 
Educ., 315 S.E.2d 756 (N.C.App. 1984). 
86 See Higgins v. East Valley School Dist. 704 P.2d 630 
(Wash.App.1985); Cotton v. Gering Pub. Schools, 511 N.W.2d 549 
(continued ... ) 
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a determining factor for contribution. 87 Also, apportionment 
of student negligence is not appropriate when the teacher and 
the school district are found not guilty. 88 
While each of the states presents a unique set of 
circumstances related to vocational education which qualifies 
as service-learning, some general agreement on principles 
emerges: (1) Determination of teacher negligence, the level of 
culpability, and whether contribution was present and to what 
degree are generally questions for juries, not matters of law 
for judges to decide. ( 2) Courts distinguish between liability 
based on negligence and liability based on maintenance of 
86 ( ••• continued) 
(Neb.App.1993); see also Marcantel v. Allen Parish School Bd., 
490 So. 2d 1162 (La .App. 3d Cir .1986) discussing contribution by 
students participating in a makeshift football game. 
87 Barbin on Behalf of Barbin v. State, 506 So.2d 888, 
(La.App. 1 Cir. 1987). 
88 See Fontenot v. State through Dept. of Educ., 635 So. 
2d 627 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994) in which a severe hand 
laceration to a student in a special education class did not 
create liability for the teacher even though the student 
charged the teacher with two counts of wilful negligence and 
quoting at 628 from Prier v. Horace Mann Insurance Co., 351 
So.2d 265 (La. App. 3d Cir.) writ denied, 352 So. 2d 1042, 
1045 (La. 1977) "[s]chool teachers charged with the duty of 
superintending children in the school must exercise reasonable 
supervision over them, commensurate with the age ... and the 
attendant circumstances. A greater degree of care must be 
exercised if the student is required to use or to come in 
contact with an inherently dangerous object, or to engage in 
an activity where it is reasonably foreseeable that an 
accident or injury may occur. The teacher is not liable 
... unless it is shown that ... might have prevented the act 
which caused the damage, and did not do so. It is also 
essential to recovery that there be proof of negligence in 
failing to provide the required supervision and proof of a 
causal connection between the lack of supervision and its 
accident ... (citations omitted)." 
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defective equipment. ( 3) The II in loco parent is II status of 
elementary and secondary school teachers in most states acts 
as a shield in claims of ordinary negligence. ( 4) Where 
injured students prove teachers or other school employees' 
acts were wilful, wanton, or reckless, statutory bars to 
immunity from tort liability generally will not apply. ( 5) 
Vicarious liability based on a master-servant relationship 
usually does not apply in the student-teacher relationship. 
(6) A state code granting immunity from tort to teachers does 
not bar a tort claim under the due process clause of the 
U.S.Constitution. (7) Purchase of liability insurance by an 
educational institution does not necessarily estop it from a 
plea of sovereign or governmental immunity where statutory 
entitlement exists. 
Usually, negligence is considered an unintentional 
tort. 89 At the university level, this opens the door for a 
plea by the university of not guilty based on lack of 
scienter. This could excuse the case against the university 
even though duty is the issue. However, if negligence is 
redefined as failure to meet an acceptable standard of care, 
then intentional and unintentional torts would be included. 90 
This could provide enhanced protection for students without 
jeopardizing the position of educational institutions. 
89 Drushal, supra note 2, at 619 n.62 relating the tort 
of negligence to the student as consumer. 
90 Id. at 619. 
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Furthermore, an institution could not be liable if its 
standards were equal to or exceeded those of like institutions 
in similar circumstances. 
School Codes 
In Illinois, student teachers, teachers and other 
specifically enumerated classes of school-related personnel 
are explicitly covered under 105 ILCS 5/10.20.20 which 
protects them from suit. When acting within the regular scope 
of their authority as vested in them by the school board 
through the building principal and the cooperating classroom 
teacher, student teachers cannot be sued for injuries to 
others. However, the statute dictates a loss of immunity from 
suit in cases where injury arises from acts or omissions of 
acts which are deemed wilful and wanton. While in the past, 
wilful and wanton action was the equivalent of an intentional 
tort, in modern Illinois case law wilful and wanton action is 
a point on the continuum between unintentional and intentional 
tort but tending to weigh closer to an intentional tortious 
act or omission. 
Illinois Boards of Education also are charged with the 
responsibility to purchase liability insurance and include 
student teachers in those covered under the policy. The 
policy protects against any loss or liability arising out of 
civil rights claims and suits, constitutional rights claims 
and suits, and death and bodily injury and property damage 
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claims and suits. This insurance may cover the costs for 
defenses when damages are sought for acts which are alleged to 
be negligent or wrongful and are committed within the scope of 
employment or under the direction of the school board. The 
insurer must be licensed to write school liability coverage 
within this state (105 ILCS 5/10.22.3) Note that in this 
section of the code the language implies that student teachers 
are either employees or performing functions as authorized by 
the school board. A literal construction of the language in 
this section suggests student teachers may be employees or 
actors under the direction of the board, but they are not 
simultaneously employees and actors under the direction of the 
board. Generally, the student teacher's presence in an 
Illinois school is authorized by the board but supervision and 
control of teaching activities occur at the building 
level. 
When adult students are injured or cause injury to third 
parties or to property while participating in school-related 
events that involve complex relationships, court analyses 
focus on education law in conjunction with other areas of law. 
If the student is classified as a service-learner, the 
student's role as learner or employee isn't always defined 
under the law. Therefore the laws of labor may need to be 
considered. 
Federal Labor Laws 
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Most of the statutory framework of American labor law 
which includes the child labor laws, legislation regulating 
the workplace and legislation seeking to protect workers' 
interests, emerged during the first half of the twentieth 
century. 91 Today's law of the workplace is implemented under 
the general framework of federal labor statutes and the more 
specific labor statutes which vary from state to state. 92 
The federal statutory framework was established under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) . In Walling, 93 Mr. Justice 
Black stated that the "Fair Labor Standards Act fixes the 
minimum wage that employers must pay [my emphasis] employees 
who work in activities covered by the Act ... [I]n determining 
who are 'employees' under the Act, common law employee 
categories or employer-employee classifications under other 
statutes are not of controlling significance." 94 While the 
Act does not expressly include or exclude students or persons 
working without expectation of compensation, "· .. there is no 
indication from the legislation ... that Congress intended to 
outlaw such relationships as these. " 95 While schools, 
91 Michael B. Goldstein and Peter Wolk, Legal Rights and 
Obligations of Students, Employees, and Institutions in K.G. 
Ryder, Education in a New Era: Understanding and Strengthening 
the Links Between College and the Workplace 169 (1987). 
92 Id. 
93 Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150 
(Oct.Term 1947). 
94 
95 
Walling, 330 U.S. 148, 150. 
Id. 330 U.S. 148, 152. 
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colleges, and universities are covered under the Act, 96 
" ... work experience programs that are closely related to a 
student's academic program and are conducted under the 
auspices of an educational institution would not ordinarily 
fall within the Fair Labor Standards Act, absent extenuating 
circumstances. 1197 
Although the FLSA has generated much litigation, no clear 
of the employer-employee relationship has definition 
emerged. 98 However, five criteria which may transform a 
volunteer into an employee under the FLSA have been 
identified. 99 These include: 
(1) Receiving payment (monetary or in-kind) 
(2) Providing a service which competes with or forces 
displacement of a worker; 
(3) Volunteering to one's employer if the voluntary 
task is equivalent to the work performed during the 
regular employment period; 
96 Goldstein, supra note 43. 
97 Letter to Ms. Louise Wasson of Seattle Public Schools 
from Michael Goldstein of Dow, Lohnes & Albertson 3 (January 
29, 1985) on file with the National Society for Experiential 
Education [copy on file with author]. 
98 Arnold Rehmann, Legal Issues in Experience-Based Career 
Education (research report submitted to the Career Education 
Program, National Institute of Education, (Pursuant to 
Contract OEC-0-72-5240) May 1, 1974 and reprinted with 
permission of Aries Corporation, 4930 W 77th Street, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota) at 52 indicating that Goldberg v. Wade 
Lahan Construction Co., 290 F.2d 408 (1961) cites 30 Supreme 
Court cases dealing with the definition of the employer-
employee relationship. 
99 Suzanne Tufts, Charles Tremper, Anna Seidman, and 
Jeffrey Kahn, Legal Barriers to Volunteer Service, (Nonprofit 
Risk Management Center, 1994) 4. 
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(4) Earning a livelihood from the organization for 
which the volunteer service is performed; 
(5) Doing work which benefits the organization .itself 
rather than the stated recipients of the volunteer 
assignment. 100 
Generally, the FLSA does not apply to persons working to 
accomplish "public service, religious, or humanitarian " goals 
if their donated services are not causing the displacement of 
workers. 101 
However, it has been established that what constitutes 
work is a question of law; 102 and all who provide services 
are not necessarily employees. 103 When determining the 
existence of an employer-employee relationship, the power to 
control a service provider's conduct is considered the most 
significant element . 104 If the existence of an employment 
100 Id. noting that these criteria were developed by 
interpreting multiple Labor Department documents; see also 
Michael B. Goldstein, Legal Issues in Combining Service and 
Learning in Jane C. Kendall and Associates, Combining Service 
and Learning: A Resource Book for Community and Public 
Service, Volume II (1990) stating that "the Fair Labor 
Standards Act implies that one cannot [be employed without 
being paid for the work] but the decisions remain unclear." 
101 Tufts et al., supra note 47, at 5. 
102 Amicus brief for petitioner, Tennessee C. I. & R. Co. 
v. Muscoda, 88 L. Ed. 949, 951b; but see Justice Roberts' 
dissent stating " ... what Congress meant by work was ... the 
actual service rendered to the employer for which he pays 
wages in conformity to custom or agreement" at 962a. 
103 United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 712 (1947); 91 
L.Ed. 1757, 1767b. 
104 See NLRB v. Hearst Pub.,Inc., 88 L. Ed. 1170 (1944) 
at 1173a (defining terms in accordance with the National Labor 
(continued ... ) 
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relationship is determined by the National Labor Relations 
Board (N.L.R.B.), this determination is regarded as conclusive 
when supported by the evidence; 105 case law defines the 
employment relationship under the FLSA and the Social Security 
Act. 106 
Under the Wage-Hour Administrative Ruling WH- 70, a 
multipart test is used to determine whether work an intern 
performs constitutes employment under the FLSA. 107 If all 
the conditions of the test are satisfied, an academic 
104 ( ••• continued) 
Relations Act); Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, (1947) 
at 127a (stating" ... person having the right of control over 
the services to be rendered is the employer of those over whom 
he has such right of control, and it is entirely immaterial 
and irrelevant whether or not he exercises that control"); 
United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947) at 712 (indicating 
that absence of an expressly reserved right of control in a 
single feature [of the work] may become the criterion for 
deciding who is the employer) ; Rutherford Food Corp. v. 
McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (for the statutory definitions of 
employer and employee for the FLSA and also indicating that 
determination of an employment relationship depends on the 
whole activity and not isolated factors); Goldstein, supra 
note 43, at 172. 
105 See N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publishing, Inc. 322 U.S. 
111, 131 (stating that the role of the courts is limited when 
an agency has the duty of initial review); 88 L.Ed. 1170, 
1170b, 1180b (indicating that N.L.R.B. decisions do not depend 
on state law to determine existence of employer-employee 
relationships). 
106 Rehmann, supra note 48, at 51 - 54. 
107 Letter to Ms Wasson, supra note 47, at 2 (indicating 
that primary benefit of work performed must flow to the 
student; that work must be under the auspices [e.g., 
protection or patronage according to Webster's Dictionary] of 
the educational institution; that compensation was not a 
consideration at the inception of the internship; that no 
anticipation of regular employment existed at the completion 
of the program. ) 
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internship is exempted from the FLSA coverage because the 
primary benefit of the experience flows to the student . 108 
When a court emphasizes the value of the training as the 
benefit flowing to the student, a situation analogous to 
traditional forms of compensation may be created and thus 
establish an employment relationship. 109 Also, in one state 
there is a possibility that students in experienced-based 
learning situations who are reimbursed for out-of-pocket 
expenses could be considered employees.no 
Workers' Compensation Rules 
Determination of status as an employee is critical for 
receipt of workmen's compensation which provides financial 
assistance to an employee who sustains a work-related injury, 
regardless of the cause of the injury.n1 However, employee 
or salary status is not the only requisite condition for 
108 Id. at 2; see also note 48, 50 and accompanying text. 
109 See infra note 61 discussing appellate decision in 
Barragan v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd, 240 Cal, Rptr. 
811 (1987); see also Rehmann, supra note 46, at 69. 
no Whitepaper from Off ice of Experiential Education, 
University of Kentucky, Kentucky Workmen's Compensation and 
Experiential Learning Situations, (May 6, 1974). 
n 1 Michael B. Goldstein, Liability for Volunteers' 
Injuries, Synergist 42 - 44 (Winter 1979) indicating workmen's 
compensation is a form of statutory insurance paid for by an 
employer and provides recovery for medical costs and lost 
earnings resulting from injury due to employee's own or 
employer's negligence. 
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entitlement to compensation. 112 Sometimes, if an employment 
relationship can be determined, a volunteer, as an employee, 
may be protected under workmen's compensation. 113 Students 
participating in the University of Kentucky Experiential 
Education Program possess statutory entitlement to the state 
compensation program if they incur a placement-related 
injury. 114 This "no-fault-type" insurance exists in every 
state, but the workers covered under the law vary. 115 
Under the pertinent paragraphs of the Worker's 
Compensation Act of Illinois (820 ILCS 305/1) "employer" and 
112 Rehmann, supra note 46, at 76. 
113 See Barragan v. Worker's Compensation Board 240 Cal. 
Rptr. 811 (1987) where a student in a degree-required 
internship was injured during the course of performing service 
and was refused compensation by the hospital because she was 
not an employee; where the determination was overturned by the 
California Court of Appeals which found four reasons that 
entitled the student intern to compensation: (1) an employer-
employee relationship was created when the student performed 
a service (assisting patients) and was rewarded by the 
hospital (receiving training and instruction); (2) the 
hospital directed all her service and accorded her the same 
treatment as all other employees; ( 3) no exclusions for 
students were included in the states worker's compensation 
statute; (4) the student was not a true volunteer because the 
internship was a degree requirement; see also Goldstein, supra 
note 59, at 43c; Tufts et al., supra note 48 at 4. 
114 Under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 342. 640 everyone 
who is under an express or implied contract of hire is an 
employee except those specifically exempted under KRS 342. 650. 
Kentucky students working out of state can collect in Kentucky 
so long as the employment contract is made in Kentucky, and 
the student can be classified as an employee in Kentucky; or 
the student can also file in the employer's state. 
115 Rehmann, supra note 46, at 76. 
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"employee" are defined as follows: 
(a) The term "employer" as used in this Act means: 
1. The State and each county, city, town, township, 
incorporated village, school district, body politic, or 
municipal corporation therein. 
2. Every person, firm, public, or private 
corporation, including hospitals, public service, 
eleemosynary, religious or charitable corporations or 
associations who has any person in service or under any 
contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, 
and who is engaged in any of the enterprises or 
businesses enumerated in Section 3 of this Act, or who ... 
has ....... elected to become subject to the 
provisions of this Act, and who has not, prior to such 
accident, effected a withdrawal of such election in the 
manner provided in this Act. 
(b) The term "employee" as used in this Act means: 
1. Every person in the service of the State, 
including members of the General Assembly, members of the 
Commerce Commission, members of the Industrial 
Commission, and all persons in the service of the 
University of Illinois, county, including ... city, town, 
township, incorporated village or school district, body 
politic, or municipal corporation therein, whether by 
election, under appointment or contract of hire, express 
or implied, oral or written, ... and including any 
official of the State, any county, city town, township, 
incorporated village school district, body politic or 
municipal corporation therein except ... is an employee 
under this Act only with respect to claims brought under 
paragraph (c) of Section (8). 
One employed by a contractor who has contracted with 
the State, or a county, city, town, township,incorporated 
village, school district, body politic or municipal 
corporation therein, through its representatives, is not 
considered as an employee of the State, county, city, 
town, township, incorporated village, school district, 
body politic or municipal corporation which made the 
contract. 
2. Every person in the service of another under 
any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or 
written, including persons whose employment is outside of 
the State of Illinois where the contract of hire is made 
within the State of Illinois, persons whose employment 
results in fatal or non-fatal injuries within the State 
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of Illinois where the contract of hire is made outside of 
the State of Illinois, and persons whose employment is 
principally localized within the State of Illinois, 
regardless of the place of the accident or the. place 
where the contract of hire was made, and including 
aliens, and minors who, for the purposes of this Act are 
considered the same and have the same powers to contract, 
receive payments and give quittances therefor (sic), as 
adult employees. 
Determination of "employee" status sufficient to activate 
state worker's compensation benefits must be resolved by 
reference to the history and fundamental purposes of the act 
not simply the technical contractual or common law conceptions 
of employment. 116 
point. 
The following cases should clarify this 
A student at the University of Illinois was partially 
paralyzed due to spinal cord or nervous system injury 
sustained making a fire dive at a water circus in the 
gymnasium swimming pool. 117 The student filed a claim under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act against the University's Board 
of Trustees and the Athletic Association, both 
corporations. 118 The hearing officer for the Industrial 
Commission dismissed the petition for want of 
116 82 Am Jur 2d, sec. 143 
117 Athletic Association of the University of Illinois v. 
Industrial Commission, 384 Ill. 208. 
118 Record by Petitioners at 244, Athletic Association of 
the University of Illinois v. Industrial Commission 384 Ill. 
208 (Sup.Ct., January Term, A.D. 1943) (No. 27032). 
54 
jurisdiction. 119 
On appeal to the Industrial Commission a certified copy 
of the Athletic Association charter was included with the 
evidence. Based on the evidence presented to the arbitrator, 
including the certified copy of the organization's charter, 
the Industrial Commission entered a determination in the form 
of monetary compensation for the student. The case was 
reviewed by the Circuit Court on certiorari, 120 and the 
decision of the Industrial Commission was approved and 
confirmed. 
The opinion of the circuit court, focused on the 
relationship between the University and the Athletic 
Association and concluded that the evidence indicated the 
Association existed as an "entirely independent corporation" 
chartered under the nonprofit statutes of the state . 121 
Furthermore, since Association funds were held solely in the 
name of the Association and not the University, a judgement 
against the Association would not "control the action of the 
State or subject it to liability." 122 Finally, citing to 16 
C.J.S. 374, 375 and McDermott v. A.B.C. Oil Burner Sales Corp, 
119 Id. accepting the opinion of University counsel that 
the Association was an agency of the University which was an 
arm of the State which claims were to be heard by the Courts 
of Claims. 
120 
121 
122 
Id. at 245. 
Record, supra note 67, at 251. 
Id. at 252. 
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266 Ill.App. 115, 121 the opinion concluded that the 
"Association is only liable for its own acts and a 
judgement against it has no legal effect whatever against the 
University. "123 
After resolving the issue of the Athletic Association's 
relationship to the University, the employer-employee 
relationship was analyzed in terms of the Association charter, 
organizational insurance for employee injury, and the status 
of the petitioner (student). Then referring to the Workmen's 
Compensation Act in force at the time of litigation, citing 
supporting case law and providing a lengthy discussion of the 
relationships of the parties, the opinion concludes: (1) that 
petitioner is an employee; (2) that the Association controls 
the activity; and (3) that the activity fell under the usual 
course of trade or business of the Association. 124 Under 
Illinois Statutes125 and case law126 this is an appropriate 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 254 - 269. 
125 Ill. Bar R.S. 1941, Ch. 48, Sec. 156 (f) states: 
"The decision of the industrial commission acting within its 
powers ... shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive unless 
reviewed as in this paragraph hereinafter provided. " The 
following section says: "(1). The Circuit Court ... shall by 
writ of certiorari to the Industrial Commission have power to 
review all questions of law and fact presented by such 
record." 
u 6 See Brief for Respondent at 49, Athletic Association 
of the University of Illinois v. Industrial Commission, 384 
Ill. 208 discussing Parker-Washington Co. v. Industrial Board, 
274 Ill. 498, 501-02, 113 N.E. 976, 978 (stating that the 
Circuit and Supreme courts can only review questions of law 
(continued ... ) 
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outcome. However, the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the 
decision on a writ of error and reversed the award. 
This court determined that the analysis of the lower 
courts created a strained construction of the term 'employee' 
for purposes of the Act. The court distinguished between 
liberal construction and a strained construction designed to 
extend the scope of the Act to employments or occupations not 
fairly within the Act. The principle of law then is that the 
term "employee" must be construed to reflect the legislative 
intent of the Act. 
Nearly 30 years later, in The Board of Education of the 
City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission et al., 127 the 
Supreme Court of Illinois held that where the 100 hours of 
clinical observation performed by an education student were a 
university requirement which students were expected to 
complete in the course of their training, a student who was 
injured in the course of completing these hours was not an 
126 ( ••• continued) 
when reviewing proceedings of the Industrial Commission and if 
the evidence supports the decision of the commission, it is 
out of the province of the courts to comment upon the weight 
or the sufficiency of the evidence); quoting Chicago & Midland 
Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 362 Ill. 257. 261, 199 N.E. 
828, 830(stating that the Supreme Court has a duty to consider 
the evidence; will not substitute its judgement for that of 
the Industrial Commission especially where the decision of the 
Commission has received the endorsement of the circuit court 
unless the judgement is clearly and manifestly against the 
weight of the evidence); and Perkins Products Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 379 Ill. 115, 117, 39 N.E. (2d) 372, 
373(quoting Chief Justice Smith to the same effect). 
127 53 Ill.2d 167, 290 N.E. 2d 247. 
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'employee' of the Chicago Board of Education and therefore not 
entitled to receive compensation for the injuries she 
sustained when she fell down the stairs. 128 To support its 
position, the court referred to the social policy involved 
stating that the purpose of compensation in this state and 
others is to restore lost wages II for workers whose earning 
power is interrupted or terminated as a consequence of 
injuries arising out of and in the course of their 
employment. 11129 Also that throughout the country the 
interpretations involving compensation laws have uniformly 
excluded gratuitous workers from coverage . 130 Receipt of 
wages is a determining factor for entitlement to workers' 
compensation benefits. 
A third Illinois case, an appeal from the decision of the 
circuit court, serves to emphasize the need for assent to 
employment by the parties as a condition for receiving 
compensation for a job-related injury. This claimant applied 
for compensation benefits for injuries sustained in a fall 
while supervising lunchroom activities. For this service she 
128 Chgo Bd. of Ed. v. Industrial Com. 53 Ill.2d 167 
129 Id. at 1 71 citing to Coclasure v. Industrial Com. 
(1958), 14 Ill.2d 455; Lambert v. Industrial Com. (1952), 411 
Ill. 593) . 
130 Id. at 1 71 citing to discussion and cases in lA A. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law (1967), sec. 47 .10 et seq.; 
99 C.J.S., Workmen's Compensation, sec. 64; but see Orphant v. 
St. Louis State Hospital (Mo.1969), 441 S.W. 2d 355 where the 
statute embodied contrary legislative intent. 
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received $52 per month from the school PTA. 131 Claimant was 
a volunteer in the school at other times of the day. The 
school principal attested to knowledge of the claimant's pay 
from the PTA for lunchroom supervision services, that she and 
the assistant principal supervised the claimant's work and 
that she had the power to terminate claimant's services should 
they prove unsatisfactory. The claimant was under the control 
and supervision of the principal, not the PTA. 132 Board 
knowledge was immaterial because the principal as agent for 
the Board was acting within the scope of her authority. The 
decision of the circuit court denying an award for 
compensation benefits was reversed and the award of the 
Commission reinstated. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois distinguished the instant 
case from the prior case on two counts: (1) The Board offered 
the education student no consideration for her services. (2) 
The student did not consider herself to be an employee, nor 
did the Board consider her as a Board of Education employee 
even though the principal directed and controlled the student 
teacher's activities at the school. The legal principle that 
emerges is that students participating in curriculum-imposed 
activities and receiving no wages for their services are 
131 The Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. The 
Industrial Commission et al., 57 Ill. 2d 339, 312 N.E. 2d 244 
(1974). 
132 Id. at 245. 
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volunteers, not employees based on Illinois law in 1972. 
In the instant case, a school volunteer acting as the 
school's lunchroom supervisor, an activity for which she 
received a monetary compensation, was an employee in her 
capacity as supervisor. Citing its decision against the 
student claimant, the Illinois Supreme Court reiterated that 
'it is generally recognized that a true employer-employee 
relationship does not exist in the absence of the payment or 
expected payment of consideration in some form by employer to 
employee.' Although the payment was indirect (The PTA paid 
for the lunchroom supervisor's services), the Court cited its 
holding in Forest Preserve District v. Industrial Com. (1934), 
357 Ill.389, 192 N.E.342 which determined that an employer 
need not pay an employee if the employer is aware that a third 
party is paying the employee for the services performed for 
the employer. 133 It also quoted from lA A.Larson, Law of 
Workmen's Compensation (1973), sec. 47.41n.1 cited in Forest 
Preserve District, that 'so long as there is some kind of pay, 
it is not essential that the payment come from the 
employer. ' 134 
Authority supporting student teachers as employees is in 
conflict. In some states, student teachers who are injured in 
the course of student teaching assignments may be employees of 
133 
134 
Id. at 246. 
Id. 
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their colleges; 135 in other states, they may be employees of 
the school districts to which they are assigned for purposes 
of worker's compensation; 136 or their status may be 
undefined. 
Bringing service-learners within the meaning of 
"employee" under state workmen's compensation statutes may 
result in a "win-win'' situation for both the student and the 
organization which accepts the student. In the event of injury 
to the student, the organization's liability is limited 
because a covered employee cannot sue for negligence except 
under limited and unusual circumstances . 137 The covered 
employee who is injured usually receives remuneration for lost 
compensation and/or medical costs. 138 Thus, only those in 
limited and unusual circumstances or those not covered by 
compensation statutes would be inclined to bring an action for 
the tort of negligence against the organization which acts as 
135 See School Dist. No. 60 v. Industrial Commission, 
Colo .App., 601 P. 2d 651 where under Colorado statute the 
student teacher was determined to be an 'employee' of the 
state university which he attended and had been 'placed with 
an employer' when he was assigned by the college to a public 
school district and was injured when supervising playground 
activities and therefore entitled compensation. 
136 Illinois and California in particular; although 
analogous situations may exist in other states 
137 Supra note 73; see also Goldstein, supra note 59 at 
44a. 
138 Id. 
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an employer. 139 
Decisions in other jurisdictions generally have affirmed 
the principles presented above. Student nurses who pay 
tuition but are required to work regular shifts in addition to 
attending classes and serve without pay under the direction of 
the supervisory staff of the hospital while they are working 
are employees within the compensation act when they receive 
room and board which represent remuneration. 140 However, 
student nurse trainees who do not receive wages of some 
statutorily acceptable form may not be employees as a matter 
of law even where prejudicial authority recognizing training 
and control as wages exists. 141 There is also authority to 
139 Diane L. Banks, Legal Issues in International 
Cooperative Education, XXI Journal of Cooperative Education 
3:34 - 35 (1985) noting also that domestic legal issues are 
complicated when American students are assigned to 
international cooperative education programs. Problems arising 
include non-coverage under workmen's compensation programs, 
compliance with governing statutes, labor laws, immigration 
laws, and import-export laws of the respective countries as 
well as the contractual issues between institutions or 
students and landlords. 
tto In Re Brewer's Case, 141 N.E.2d 281; see also Caraway 
Methodist Hospital v. Pitts, 57 So.2d 96, 100 for other cases 
indicating that the relationship between a student nurse and 
a hospital under a similar fact situation is that of employer 
to employee . 
141 Salvation Army v. Mathews, Ky. App 847 S.W.2d 751 
(1993) where female enrolled in a school program leading to 
licensure for practical nurses, paid the required tuition for 
full-time study, and worked at a designated hospital, under 
supervision of the teacher or person affiliated with the 
nursing school, to fulfill the practical training requirement 
sustained injuries as the result of a fall; where student 
claim under the Kentucky Worker's Compensation Act was denied 
based on her non-employee status and on appeal via memorandum 
(continued ... ) 
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support the non-employee status of nurse's aide trainees who 
receive uncompensated training in hospitals with no promise of 
positions upon completion of the training . 142 
While the job status of apprentice medical-related 
personnel may be problematic and require determination on a 
case by case basis, it is possible that these personnel may be 
students for some purposes and employees for others. 143 Lab-
141 ( ••• continued) 
argued that she was an 'apprentice' under applicable statutes; 
where review board responded that instant case which provided 
no remuneration whereas cases brought in other health 
facilities demonstrated receipt of some form of in-kind 
compensation determined claimant to be a non-employee for 
purposes of compensation; where claimant appealed to 
compensation board which cited Mississippi case law accepting 
student nurse training as compensation based on statutes of 
that state coupled with control exercised over clinical 
training to qualify Mississippi student nurse for compensation 
benefits and awarded benefits to Kentucky student stating that 
training alone was sufficient under KRS 342.0011(17) to 
qualify student nurse as employee for compensation benefits; 
where hospital appealed decision based on definitions in state 
compensation act indicating that wages were a critical factor 
for determination of an employment relationship under Kentucky 
statutes and court agreed indicating that under statutory 
provision KRS342. 640 contracts for apprenticeships also 
required remuneration to provide protection under compensation 
statutes. 
142 Henderson v. Jennie Edmundson Hospital, 178 N. W. 2d 
429 (1970) where judge reviewing the industrial commissioner's 
determination held that the evidence that trainee had received 
neither compensation nor a promise of future employment was 
sufficient to determine that trainee was not employee at time 
of injury and affirmed denial of award. 
143 See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center and Cedars-Sinai 
Housestaff Association, 223 N.L.R.B. No.57 (March 19, 1976) 
which is frequently cited for its determination that interns, 
residents and clinical fellows are ''primarily students" and 
therefore not employees subject to the N.L.R.A. collective 
bargaining provision; but see an earlier case, City of Miami 
(continued ... ) 
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technician trainees, one group of medical-related personnel, 
may be apprentices at the hospitals where they provide 
services and qualified as employees of the hospital for 
compensation benefits when injured in the course of the 
training. 144 
There have also been claims that persons enrolled in 
programs for medical-related personnel occupy a dual status, 
simultaneous student-employee status . 145 One such claimant 
enrolled in an accredited nursing school under a federal 
~
3 ( ••• continued) 
v. Oates, 10 So.2d 721 (Dec. 1, 1942) which determined that a 
hospital, organized under statute and operated by a 
municipality, is liable for the negligent acts of an interne, 
as it is for those of a nurse, under "respondeat superior" 
because both are employees and that acts of negligence by a 
nurse are answerable in damages. 
144 Wilson Memorial Hospital, Inc., 226 S.E. 2d 225 where 
a student attending a technical institute was assigned to a 
cooperating hospital for on-the-job training as a lab-
technician pursuant to a curriculum requirement received on-
site training and free laundry service while working 40 hours 
per week without wages and performed tests, analyses, and 
procedures as a hospital agent as did full-time employees in 
this department was determined to be an apprentice within the 
meaning of the applicable North Carolina statute and providing 
the clarification that the court found "these trainees not to 
be primarily students, but rather to be apprentice employees 
within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act"; and 
noting that although the record indicates the trainees were 
covered by the Act, the agreement between the school and the 
hospital did not have a provision to effect the Act and the 
agreement between the school and hospital did not contain a 
provision for indemnification to secure the hospital against 
loss or damage that could result from trainee injury. 
145 See Anaheim General Hosp. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. , 
83 Cal.Rptr. 495, 499 (Jan. 13,1970) citing Van Horn v. 
Industrial Acc. Com., 219 Cal.App.2d 457, 33 Cal.Rptr. 169; 
Union Lumber Co. v. Industrial Acc.Com.12 Cal.App.588, 594, 55 
P. 2d 911; Hanna, California Law of Employee Injuries and 
Workmen's Compensation [2d ed.] vol.2, sec. 5.01(2) (a). 
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program which provided the claimant with tuition and a weekly 
maintenance allowance and paid the school for each hour of 
formal instruction it provided to her . 146 One of the 
requirements for licensure, clinical experience, could only be 
attained in a hospital setting (Cal.Adm.Code, Title 16, sec. 
2557) . 147 The teacher in the nursing program had to be 
acceptable to the hospital and received her salary from the 
hospital. Additionally the hospital paid the school an hourly 
per student rate for time spent by each student in the 
hospital. Daily training was 25% academic and 75% clinical. 
Activities were commensurate with experience and progressed 
from routine patient care to administration of medicine and 
changing dressing.~ 8 
146 Anaheim General Hosp. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. , 83 
Cal. Rptr. 495 (1970); but see Otten v. State et al., 40 N.W. 
2d 81 (Dec.9, 1949) for an earlier case on appeal where a 
student nurse at a state university taking courses under the 
United States Cadet Nurses Corps program which covered 
tuition, fees, and other expenses and received a monthly 
stipend from the University and non-monetary compensation from 
the affiliates where she received her clinical training 
including the hospital where she contracted a disease causing 
a disability and where the University maintained full control 
over her on-campus program, assignments to clinical rotations 
and her personal conduct and deportment was deemed an employee 
of the state university at the onset of disease because 
factors considered as decisive (hiring, payment of 
compensation, the right to hire and fire, and the right to 
control the means and manner of the performance of the work) 
were all under the control of the university which never 
relinquished control of supervision or assignment of rotations 
to affiliate sites and as an employee of the university 
claimant was entitled to recover compensation only from it. 
147 
148 
Id. at 496, 
Id. at 497. 
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There was no evidence of a contract between the student 
and the hospital. However, the claimant's services benefitted 
the hospital. Although no actual wages were received, the 
hourly rate the hospital paid to the school represented 
"consideration in the form of the school's willingness to 
accept her as a student despite the eventuality it might not 
be paid for the full course by the government in the event she 
dropped out. "149 
In its determination of whether a student who receives 
on-the-job training is an employee of a 3rd party, the court 
emphasized three findings. (1) Valid consideration for an 
employment contract existed because the hospital benefitted 
from the services of the student and because of the conditions 
under which the hospital paid the school for the attendance of 
each student trainee. (2) The hospital maintained exclusive 
control and direction over the work the student performed 
including the teacher which the school provided. (3) Because 
the hospital had complete control over the work including the 
supervision of the teacher, the court inf erred that the 
student could be terminated for infraction of its rules or 
unsatisfactory service. As a result of these findings, the 
court held that an implied contract of employment existed and 
that the dual status of student-employee at time of injury 
entitled the student nurse to compensation benefits. The court 
also opined that for worker's compensation benefits, it is 
149 Id. 
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better to view student teachers and student nurses as 
employees . 150 
Volunteers 
Service-learners classified as volunteers retain 
vulnerability to lawsuits in approximately half of the 
states. 151 In Illinois limited volunteer liability is 
extended for service provided for any corporation which is 
organized under the Illinois Nonprofit Corporations Act and 
which qualifies for tax exemption under Internal Revenue Code, 
sec. 50l(c) (3). Usually coverage applies to charitable 
organizations or to other groups which include homeowners' 
associations, licensed medical facilities, and other 
organizations that would be tax exempt but for legislative or 
political activities . 152 Exceptions are enumerated in the 
statute. To bring suit for a cause of action, the involved 
conduct must be wilful and wanton; and persons bringing suit 
must be serving without compensation other than for actual 
[author's emphasis] expenses. 153 
Under provisions of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, 745 
150 Id. at 298. 
151 Nonprofit Risk Management Center, Two Paths to 
Volunteer Protection, 4 Community Risk Management & Insurance 
9 (September 1995). 
152 805 
(Smith-Hurd) 
153 Id. 
Illinois Compiled Statutes ( ILCS) 105/108.70 
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ILCS 80/1 (Smith-Hurd), sports volunteers may be compensated 
for reasonable expenses; and umpires or referees are allowed 
to accept a modest honorarium. While the statute lists persons 
covered and the parameters of their participation, there is no 
protection from civil liability; and conduct falling 
"substantially below" accepted practice and standards is not 
protected. Other exclusions are enumerated. 
Volunteers providing medical services in medical clinics 
must be licensed to practice the treatment of humans in any 
state or territory of the United States. They, like most 
other volunteers, must be uncompensated and are not protected 
from civil liability. As a point of distinction, the 
limitations of liability for volunteers providing medical 
services apply only if they are posted in the free medical 
clinic. Other exclusions and conditions exist . 154 
Because their roles are not clearly defined under the 
law, students who at tempt to recover damages under state 
compensation statutes for injuries sustained in the course of 
participation in university events may find themselves in 
uncertain and complex legal arenas. 
154 225 ILCS 60/31 (Smith-Hurd). 
CHAPTER IV 
MANDATORY COMMUNITY SERVICE IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS 
USA Today, September 15, 1993, reported that polls 
indicate in excess of 60% of American youth ages twelve to 
seventeen years engage in volunteer work. 155 While it is 
unclear whether or not these figures represent the growing 
number of school districts which require mandatory community 
service, it should be noted that at the present time at least 
seventeen states have some type of youth service policy for 
high school students. 156 In several school districts 
155 Schools Shouldn't Force Community Service, USA Today, 
Sept.15, 1993, at A12. 
156 See Nancy Murphy, European Council of International 
Schools, 1996 Autumn Conference, Nice, France, listing 14 
states and the District of Columbia [Arkansas Act 648 (1993); 
California Community Service Pilot Projects legislation 
passed, but appropriations denied (1990) and Challenge School 
District Initiative (1996) requiring that by 2004 all high 
school students will participate in at least one course 
service-learning course before graduation from high school; 
Connecticut (1988); District of Columbia; Hawaii (1996); 
Kentucky links service-learning to state education reform 
(1990); Maryland requires community service for graduation 
from all public high schools (1992); Massachusetts (1994); 
Minnesota (1987, 1993); Ohio House Bill 396 (1992); Oklahoma 
Senate Bill 680 allows school districts to award credit for 
community service (1992); Oregon HB 3293 authorized the 
Department of Education to create community service programs 
(1989); Pennsylvania (1993); South Carolina (1994); Utah 
(1988)]; see also Eastern Regional Information Center, 
Implementing Community Service in K-12 Schools: A Report on 
Policies and Practices in the Eastern Region (June 1997) which 
(continued ... ) 
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mandatory community service policies have been instituted. 157 
Opponents of the service-learning requirement have 
challenged its constitutionality on three grounds. First, 
required community service infringes on expressive conduct as 
proscribed under the First Amendment. Second, compelled free 
service violates protection against involuntary servitude 
guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment. Third, parents' 
rights to control the education of their children as secured 
under the Fourteenth Amendment are usurped. Proponents of the 
requirement usually cite policy or altruistic reasons . 158 
At this time, no service-learning suit has been litigated 
in Illinois or in the Seventh Judicial Circuit. However, 
recent decisions in cases from other jurisdictions, although 
not establishing precedent, create persuasive authority for 
156 ( ••• continued) 
identifies the states of South Carolina, New Hampshire and 
Vermont. 
157 N. Murphy, Resource Sheet: Mandatory Service, 
European Council of International Schools, 1996 Autumn 
Conference, Nice, France reports the following although others 
may exist: Bethlehem, Pennsylvania; Atlanta, Georgia; 
Chatham, Georgia; Canaw County, West Virginia; Mason City, 
West Virginia; Chapel Hill-Carrboro, North Carolina; 
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan; Rye High School, Rye, New York; 
Detroit Public Schools, Detroit, Michigan; District of 
Columbia, Washington, D. C,; Westchester County, New York; 
Raleigh, North Carolina; Dade County (Miami), Florida; San 
Antonio, Texas; Corpus Christi, Texas; Cincinnati, Ohio; and 
Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. 
158 Examples of reasons for service-learning or community 
service requirements for graduation include active involvement 
in learning, excellent preparation for responsible 
citizenship, a need for exposure to service so that students 
will not neglect it later in life, to instill a positive 
feeling about service to others, etc. 
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the analyses that may be shaping the development of legal 
theories related to service-learning in secondary and lower 
schools. 
The earliest on-point case in the secondary schools is 
Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School District. 159 This case 
raises two issues. First it considers whether a requirement 
that students perform community service to be entitled to 
graduate from high school compels students to engage in 
expressive conduct that infringes on their First Amendment 
freedom. Next, it seeks to determine whether the requirement 
constitutes "involuntary servitude" which is forbidden under 
the Thirteenth Amendment. 
In Steirer the public school district adopted a 
graduation requirement that all high school students, except 
those enrolled in special education classes, must complete 
sixty hours of unpaid community service. 
provide services in one of three programs: 
Students could 
( 1) a program 
operated by a school-district-approved agency; (2) an 
independent program selected by the school district; or (3) an 
independent program or "experiential activity" designed by the 
student and approved by appropriate school officials. 160 
Although no classroom instruction or discussion was involved, 
credit was awarded; and any student not completing the program 
159 789 F.Supp. 1337 (E.D.Pa. 1992), aff'd., 987 F.2d 989 
(3d Cir.) ,cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 85 (1993). The facts were 
never disputed. 
160 789 F. Supp.1337 (E.D. PA. 1992) 
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satisfactorily would not receive a diploma from a district 
high school. 
Two students and their parents brought suit in the United 
States District Court challenging the constitutionality of the 
program and seeking a permanent injunction161 against 
enforcement of the community service requirement for high 
school graduation. The district court found for the school 
district on all counts. 
In 1995, parents and students in the Rye Neck School 
District of New York brought suit against the district on 
grounds of violation of parent rights, student liberty and 
student privacy, and Thirteenth Amendment challenges. Using 
Steirer as precedent, this court also found for the school 
district. 162 
More recently, parents and students in the Chapel Hill-
Carrboro City School District brought an action challenging 
completion of the district's community service requirement in 
order to graduate. 163 Beginning with the graduating class of 
1997, students in the Chapel Hill-Carrboro School System are 
required to complete fifty (50) hours of unpaid community 
service for high school credit while attending in order to be 
161 A permanent injunction is a court order which is 
granted after a final hearing on the merits. See Black at 316 
indicating that a permanent injunction does not last forever. 
162 Immediato v. Rye Neck School District, 873 F. Supp. 
846 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
163 See Herndon by Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro, 89 F. 
3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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eligible for graduation; service hours for transferees are 
prorated. The program permits neither an opt-out provision nor 
a credit substitution for objectors. Additionally, the 
service must be performed on the students' own time. 
Minimally, two types of service are required and hours 
spent performing clerical work or fund raising are limited. 
A program coordinator maintains a list of approved placements 
reflecting a wide variety of purposes and philosophies. The 
coordinator also may approve any placement selections not 
appearing on the approved list. However, the principal is the 
final decision-maker. 
Acceptable contexts for the service are delineated in the 
program description. The external agencies for which students 
provide services are responsible for training, supervision and 
verification of service hours. Students must submit the 
verified time sheets and a one-to-two-page reflective paper 
based on journal responses written after each particular 
service experience. 
Parents in the Chapel Hill Carrboro School System 
objected to the community service requirement for three 
reasons: (1) It violates the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition 
against involuntary servitude. (2) It violates the parents' 
right to direct the education of their children as secured 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. (3) 
freedom from compulsory service 
It is an infringement of 
guaranteed under the 
substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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The decision of the district court favoring the school 
district on all three counts was upheld at the appellate 
level. 
A strained interpretation of Constitutional issues 
surfaces from a careful reading of the Steirer, Rye-Neck, and 
Chapel Hill cases cited above. The holdings should be 
grounded in solid legal reasoning. Instead they rely heavily 
on policy considerations which lack objective bases. 164 The 
164 In Steirer the court did not even consider the 
possibility that the required community service could be 
considered expressive conduct even though plaintiffs provided 
examples of similar conduct in Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 
(1943) and Wooley, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) and similar cases 
where the acts were declared violative by the Supreme Court. 
By summarily concluding no involvement of expressive conduct 
present in required community service and ignoring even the 
possibility of involvement of expressive conduct the court 
avoided analysis of compelling affirmation which determination 
would have forced the court to find a sufficiently important 
governmental interest to justify even an incidental limitation 
of students' free speech rights guaranteed under the First 
Amendment. Hence the courts' deference based on a public 
policy attitude that all school programs compel submission to 
some value-based judgements and that value-based judgements in 
all programs are similar emerges as persuasive even though 
this conclusion is based on an incomplete argument. 
Furthermore, no rationale exists for the inconsistencies in 
the supporting examples (health education and substance abuse 
education) which include a classroom component with no active 
participation and the community service program which involves 
active participation with no classroom component. Which begs 
the question, 11 Is a credit program involving no classroom 
component truly part of the curriculum or is it a mandatory 
extra-curricular requirement (clearly an oxymoron) for which 
credit has been designated as a justification for curricular 
status which public policy exempts from serious court 
scrutiny? 11 The holding is premised on the validity of the 
defendants comparison of the community service requirement to 
selective service, jury duty, and alternative sentencing 
programs for criminal offenses. In each of those instances, 
there is a recognized civic duty involved. Do students have a 
civic duty which compels them to perform altruistic and self-
(continued ... ) 
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decisions in these cases, which challenged required service-
learning programs in lower schools, reflect a pattern of 
deference to school discretion which Ray, Bickel and Dodd each 
identified in the resolution of issues emanating from contract 
disputes in higher education, institution over individual . 165 
Earlier it was noted that Dodd espouses balancing 
institutional duties to students against students' 
expectations of duty as a means to determine outcomes of 
student challenges in higher education contract suits. In 
cases emanating from challenges in lower schools, the parents 
usually request the courts to balance the important parental 
liberty to control the education of their off-spring (what 
parents expect of state education) against the state's 
interest in educating for responsible citizenship (the state's 
duty to educate) 166 In the Steirer decision, the court 
circumvented its opportunity to establish the parameters167 
164 ( ••• continued) 
sacrificing acts? And if they do, would omission of these 
acts justify a school district from withholding a high-school 
diploma if all other graduation requirements are successfully 
completed and no alternative to the service requirement is 
provided? 
165 Ray, supra note 1 7 at 163; Bickel, supra note 22 at 
261; and Dodd, supra note 1 at 710. 
166 Brief for Appellants at 149, Herndon, et al., v. 
Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 
1996) (No. 95-2525). 
167 Steirer, 987 F.2d 989 (3rd Cir. 1993) at 997 stating 
"[h]aving decided that the Program does not compel expression 
protected by the First Amendment, it is unnecessary to 
(continued ... ) 
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for determining issues which seem to conflict with parents' 
rights to educate as guaranteed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
At all levels of education, court decisions involving 
students and schools usually express a reluctance to interfere 
with the administration of schools. However, this deference 
is limited. Schools generally are endowed with discretion in 
curricular matters but possess much less authority over 
activities outside of school. 
where students are minors . 168 
This is especially evident 
Recall that in Herndon, the 
service was to be performed on the students' own time with no 
classroom component. 
The mandatory community service requirement also has been 
challenged as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment which 
prohibits involuntary servitude. The arguments for and 
against this position center on interpretations of the phrase 
"involuntary servitude." Proponents of the service-learning 
requirement for graduation insist that the intent of the 
167 ( ••• continued) 
consider whether the state has a compelling interest in 
implementing a mandatory community service graduation 
requirement" and affirming summary judgement for the 
defendants that the mandatory community service requirement 
did not infringe on the First Amendment rights of students to 
expressive conduct nor did it infringe on the Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of parents to control and direct the 
education of their children. 
168 See E. Edmund Reutter, Jr. 760 (1994) stating that 
"it is ... legally more difficult to enforce a rule of conduct 
outside of school than inside because of potential conflicts 
with the rights of parents ... " 
Thirteenth Amendment prohibition encompasses a 
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broad 
understanding of the terms whereas opponents of the 
requirement restrict the meaning of the terms to acts akin to 
slavery. The language of the Amendment itself empowers courts 
to interpret "involuntary servitude" as compelled service for 
which no pay is rendered . 169 
Furthermore in the Steirer decision, the court determined 
that although students who resist completion of the service-
learning requirement are denied the right to graduate from a 
public high school, no coercion results because there are 
other alternatives available for completion of a high school 
169 The Thirteenth Amendment reads as follows: "Section 
1. - Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as 
punishment for crime whereof the parties shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2 - Congress shall 
have the power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation." 
Careful analysis of the language in the opening phrase of 
Section 1 indicates that the drafters of the Amendment by 
their inclusion of the word nor between slavery and 
involuntary intended to distinguish between slavery and other 
forms of involuntary servitude. Slavery references people held 
in bondage as chattel whereas involuntary servitude alludes to 
people not owned but forced to perform service against their 
will. This broader interpretation is supported in Bailey v. 
Alabama, 219 U.S. 240 (1911) (stating that [t]he words 
involuntary servitude have a larger meaning than slavery); 
U.S. v. Booker, 655 F. 2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that 
[t]he Amendment and the legislation were intended to eradicate 
not merely the formal system of slavery ... but all forms of 
compulsory involuntary service) ;United States v. Mussry, 726 
F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that the design of this 
Amendment and the statutes which enforce it are not limited to 
the classic form of slavery but apply to various circumstances 
and conditions). 
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education. 170 The court also held that since no party 
disputed the presence of educational value in the community 
service requirement, authority to remove the requirement rests 
with the state legislature rather than the judiciary. 171 To 
those opposing the community service requirement, this 
appellate court holding represents yet another example of 
court deference to institutions. 
The Supreme Court decisions consistently have 
recognized education as an important right of parents and as 
170 Steirer, 789 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D.Pa.1992) (citing to 
persuasive reasoning in Bobilin v. Board of Education, State 
of Hawaii, 403 F.Supp. 1095) at 1344 - 1346. 
171 Steirer, 987 F.2d 998 - 1000 (3rd Cir. 1993) (noting 
that although it does not regard the district court reasoning 
in Bobilin as persuasive, it [the Third Circuit court of 
Appeals] is "unprepared ... at this time, to accept the 
proposition that the Thirteenth Amendment is inapplicable 
merely because the mandatory service requirement provides a 
public benefit by saving the taxpayers money" and therefore 
postpones the public benefit argument choosing instead to 
emulate the contextual analysis in Supreme Court decisions 
which demonstrate that the critical factor in finding 
involuntary servitude is "that the victim's only choice is 
between performing the labor on the one hand and physical 
and/or legal sanctions on the other" and that even this choice 
at times does not constitute involuntary servitude as in the 
instances where government requires established civic duties 
such as military duty,jury duty, and road building with legal 
sanctions imposed for failure to comply; and embellishing this 
analysis with modern day examples of involuntary servitude and 
with non-examples of involuntary servitude which include a 
state requirement of pro bono service from attorneys as a 
condition of licensure, similar pro bono circumstances in 
medical fields, and work-release program participation for 
prisoners; and finally stating that an alternative need not be 
appealing; it must merely exist for choice to be present.) In 
effect, the Court of Appeals, by not addressing the argument 
on the grounds presented by appellant, also circumvents the 
issue. 
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an essential concern of the state to insure an educated 
citizenry. However, the Court has never recognized a 
fundamental right of parents to have their children exempt 
from a state educational requirement on secular grounds. 172 
Yet this is the very issue that parents raise when requesting 
that their offspring be excused from mandatory service 
requirements. As noted earlier, this also is the very issue 
that the analysis in Steirer avoided. Yet the subsequent 
decisions concerning mandatory service use Steirer as 
persuasive authority. 
172 See Arie Herndon, et al. v. Chapel Hill Carrboro City 
Board of Education, et al., Brief of Appellees, United States 
Court of Appeals 4th Cir. Record No. 95-2525 citing Runyon v. 
Mccrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) (explaining that the Supreme 
Court "has repeatedly stressed that ... [parents] have no 
constitutional right to provide their children with 
education unfettered by reasonable government regulation"); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 213 (1972) (stating that [t]here 
is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high 
responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose 
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic 
education"); 
CHAPTER V 
INSURANCE, WAIVERS, AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk managers recommend verification of site insurance 
before placing a student at an off-campus site for school-
related experiences. When a school signs an indemnification 
agreement 173 that passes responsibility for negligence from 
the agency hosting service-learners to the school which sends 
the service-learners, the educational institution must be 
certain that its insurance carrier will honor the transfer of 
liability. Not clearing this transfer of liability may result 
in the school bearing responsibility without insurance 
coverage . 174 
When the indemnification agreement is reversed so that 
the responsibility passes from the school to the receiving 
agency, the school still must be wary. If an agency has little 
or no insurance, the educational institution which placed the 
173 BLACK defines an indemnity agreement as an 
arrangement to compensate for a loss, damage or liability; for 
purposes of insurance law this is the principle that the 
insurance policy should not confer a benefit greater in value 
than the loss sustained by the insured. In the case of 
service-learning programs, indemnity insurance would be an 
institution's policy that applies to the institution itself or 
the property belonging to the institution. 
174 The Campus Compact Newsletter, v4 n4, Spring/Summer 
1990 at 3. 
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student still may be sued under the deep pockets theory. 175 
However, if the agency in question is a public agency, it 
usually is protected from suit by law. 
For students placed in international service-learning 
programs, insurance also is recommended. Although the U.S. 
Code 1961 places responsibility for insuring students in these 
programs on the administering program, the Mutual Security Act 
of 1954 which provides for the programs does not provide 
protection for students in international service-learning 
placements . 176 
When students in international service-learning programs 
attempt to make claims, if the insured student is the same 
nationality as the insurer, the claim is handled as a domestic 
claim under domestic law. However, rules of nationality are 
governed by international law . 177 For American students 
abroad disposition of this problem is a concern. However, 
Meron reports that international interest in the problem is 
limited to double claims . 178 
Schools which are non-profits organizations must be 
175 A legal theory of recovery; a party or entity with 
substantial assets against which a claim or judgement may be 
taken, like an insurance company, even though that party or 
entity is not responsible for the harm. 
176 L.Diane Banks, Legal Issues in International 
Cooperative Education, XXI Jrnl Coop Ed 3:36. 
177 Id. 
178 T. Meron, The 
International Claims Law," 
628 - 646. 
Insurer and the Insured 
Am Jrnl Intern'l L XVIII 
Under 
(1974) 
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especially careful of situations in which service-learners may 
be inclined to transport community members by car. Even when 
the student is classified as a volunteer, not an employee, the 
institution can be sued if the driver is found to be negligent 
or to have caused damage to property while providing service. 
In such an instance, a court will be have to determine if the 
school had the right to control the student driver, even if 
the right had never been exercised. 179 This may result in an 
insurance problem. 
According to the September 1995 issue of Community Risk 
Management & Insurance, in such an instance, a "yes" reply to 
any one of the following questions may be sufficient evidence 
of the school's right of control of an activity: (1) Who or 
what entity decided to conduct the activity? (2) Who or what 
entity planned the scope of the activity? (3) Who or what 
entity asked the particular student to drive? (4) Was the 
driver's performance supervised by the school? (5) Was the 
driving necessary? (6) Could the driving have been assigned 
to someone else? 
Additionally, questions related to scope of employment 
may also be used to determine the extent of a school's 
liability for the acts of a driver who is a service-learner. 
These questions would include the relationship of the activity 
to the mission of the school, the regularity with which the 
activity occurred, whether driving was permitted under the 
179 See supra n170. 
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policies and procedures of the service-learning program, 
whether the school authorized the driving, and whether the 
driving was related to or incidental to the normal duties of 
the service-learner. 
Although not a legal case premised on service-learning, 
the principles from Baxter v Morningside, Inc. (Wash App) 521 
P2d 946, 82 ALR3d 1206 clearly illustrate how an organization 
can be vicariously liable for the acts of its service-learners 
who are classified as volunteers. In this case a volunteer 
"expressed a willingness to run errands and perform other 
tasks as a volunteer, contingent upon need and his 
availability." 180 Morningside, Inc. accepted the volunteer's 
offer and on several occasions solicited and accepted the 
driver's gratuitous services. Because Morningside, Inc. 
called and requested the driver's assistance on the morning of 
the accident in question, and because the court determined the 
accident was caused by the negligence of the volunteer driver, 
Morningside' s right to control the work of the volunteer 
driver was examined. 
This court examined the "effect of volunteer status upon 
the existence of the master-servant relationship" and 
determined that status as a volunteer "does not necessarily 
preclude a finding that a master-servant relationship 
existed. "181 The court found that when there is mutual 
180 
181 
Baxter, 82 ALR3d 1209 
Id. at 1210. 
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agreement controlling time, destination, and purpose of a 
trip, requisite conditions for the right of control are 
present. 182 Therefore, a master-servant relationship 
existed; the volunteer driver was acting within the scope of 
a master-servant relationship; and Morningside, Inc. was 
vicariously liable for the acts of its volunteer driver. 
If driving is required as part of a service-learning 
placement, the school should define whether and what type of 
driving is within the scope of the service-learner's position. 
The educational institution should also delineate who is 
authorized to drive, the type of vehicle that is to be used, 
and for what the service-learner is allowed to drive. Clear 
guidelines for driving will limit organizational liability 
should an accident occur. 
While some institutions may be inclined to require 
waivers from service-learners, some discourage use of waivers 
for institutional protection. Disagreement arises because 
waivers cannot release a school from liability for its own 
negligence. Waivers only will protect the educational 
institution when the risks students incur are reasonable and 
foreseeable and not caused by institutional negligence. 
A waiver is a signed document indicating that the 
sponsoring entity will not be held responsible in case of 
injury or damage during an activity or event. Where children 
are the litigants, courts are almost unanimous in holding that 
182 Id. at 1211. 
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waivers do not release schools from liability for injury or 
damages which the school could have prevented during an event 
or activity in which the student was a participant. Courts 
hold that parents or guardians cannot sign away a child's 
right to sue for future injury. 
However, when adults are participants, courts have 
interpreted waivers in different ways. In a case involving a 
proprietary school, a federal court ruled that the release 
signed by a patron of a beauty school was an enforceable 
contract, and adults have the right to contract away their 
right to sue others for negligence . 183 But case law 
involving the use of waivers by colleges and universities has 
met with judicial disapproval. The arguments for this 
position are premised on the public policy position that 
acceptance of waivers creates a potential to allow future 
negligent acts by encouraging acceptance of faulty 
precautionary measures which would contribute to injuries and 
damage. 
In a 1981 case involving the dental school at Emory 
University, a dental student broke a patient's jaw. The 
patient sued and the university claimed no responsibility 
because the patient had signed a release which the university 
termed II informed consent. 11 Because those supervising the 
activities of the dental student, who for purposes of this 
183 See Popovich v. Empire Beauty Schools, Inc., 567 
F.Supp. 1440 (1983). 
85 
paper is considered a service-learner, are professional under 
the laws of the State of Georgia, the Supreme Court of that 
state ruled that a written contract, even though termed 
"informed consent" does not and cannot excuse professionals 
from the standard of care owed to their clients. 184 
Other cases exist indicating that for release forms to be 
valid, the language and circumstance must reveal that the 
parties clearly understand the definition and extent of the 
liability that is being waived. While differing court 
opinions on waivers exist, they still may be valuable in some 
circumstances. These signed documents serve as an advance 
warning to participants of inherent danger in an activity or 
event. Thus they may be used to argue that adults voluntarily 
assumed the specified risk. These forms also may discourage 
some injured parties from instituting suits against schools or 
be used by the schools to show that adequate warning was 
provided. 
When students are placed off-campus for service-learning 
experiences, schools are wise to negotiate for supervision by 
the staff of the host site. Generally speaking, the school's 
duty to care or protect increases in direct proportion to the 
degree of supervision provided. Inspection is one way to 
evaluate risks at an off-campus placement site. However, on-
site inspection programs can raise legal questions as the 
184 See Emory University v. Porubiansky, 282 S.E.2d 903. 
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following case, "unique in U.S. Law" 185 illustrates. The 
issue concerns a coordinator's responsibility during a 
cooperative education placement, a form of service-learning, 
According to the facts of this case, an engineering aide 
working in a foundry was injured in an industrial accident and 
subsequently hospitalized. At the time of injury, he was a 
second-year mechanical engineering student on his first 
cooperative assignment. Following release from the hospital, 
the student changed majors and graduated from Drexel 
University. However, at the time of the court case he had 
made no attempt at securing employment citing psychological 
impairments, physical limitations and physical pain as 
reasons; he lived with his parents and had not participated in 
State-offered job training rehabilitation programs. 
According to testimony, the purpose of the program was to 
provide students with practical experience related to their 
educational studies. The school provided the site with 
program related literature, and the site informed the 
university coordinator of the number of openings but not the 
specific openings. The university coordinator usually made 
two trips to the site. One was to discuss ways in which the 
foundry and the student might receive maximum benefit from the 
cooperative education program. The university coordinator 
185 Stewart B. Collins, Arthur Montano, & Paul M. Pratt, 
Wuerffel vs. Drexel University: Limits of a Coordinator's 
Responsibility For the Student's Work Environment, VXV Jrnl 
Coop Educ 2:15, winter 1978-79. 
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made no inquiries related to dangers at the job site, and 
training and supervision were the responsibility of the 
foundry. 
Expert testimony regarding the university coordinator's 
role was divided. If the placement was an internship, then 
the university which placed the student would have direct 
supervisory obligations. If the placement was for work-
experience, supervision and direction by the employer 
necessarily would exceed that which normally characterizes 
student-teacher relationships . 186 
Counsel for the university argued that there was no 
causal relationship between the alleged breach of duty on the 
part of the university and the accident which involved the 
engineering student. A unanimous jury found the university 
and its cooperative education coordinator were not negligent 
and that no breach of contract occurred between the university 
and the student. According to one commentator, a contrary 
decision might have caused educational institutions to 
reconsider commitments to work-experience programs. 187 
The cases cited above suggest that school administrator 
fears of litigation involving service-learning programs may be 
unfounded. Most institutions granting diplomas or degrees 
have had extensive experience placing students in work-study, 
cooperative education, and internship-type programs which are 
186 
187 
Id. at 21. 
Id. at 22. 
required for program completion. 
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These programs have 
established procedures for insurance coverage, transportation 
agreements, and placement-site insurance coverage. Some 
institutions which offer service-learning options or mandates 
have already tapped into existing insurance programs to 
provide coverage for all students participating in course-
related service-learning programs. Schools that plan to 
incorporate service-learning into their curricula may be able 
to use policies and procedures that are already in place. 
The key concern for schools which are reluctant to 
incorporate service-learning into their curricula is the risk 
of liability for negligence. As indicated earlier, negligence 
charges against education institutions generally arise from 
lack of or improper supervision. These concerns can be 
minimized by implementing policies and procedures that reduce 
risks and exposure to dangers. For example, preparing 
handbooks which clearly state the responsibilities and rights 
of all parties; requiring documented training of personnel; 
providing consistent supervision of participants; and 
evaluating personnel. 
The threat of lawsuits for organizations which have 
chosen to mandate service-learning is certainly an Achilles 
heel. Charges of negligence are of primary concern. However, 
in 1975, the National Association of Secondary School 
Principals outlined some principles for school administrators 
to abide by if they are to avoid involvement in a suit for 
89 
negligence. 188 These principles, which remain valid today, 
may be useful in developing policies and procedures to avert 
or reduce negligence in service-learning placements: 
(1) Exercise due care: The administrator of the 
program or educational institution should attempt 
to foresee dangers to students and take whatever 
precautions seem reasonable to avoid them. 
(2) Establish rules for the guidance of staff. 
(3) Assign adequate supervision for the activity. 
Courts do not expect schools to be insurers of 
student safety, but supervision is expected to be 
adequate for the circumstances. 
(4) Increase efforts to assure student safety in 
proportion to the potential for danger to result in 
injury or harm. 
(5) Acknowledge the direct correlation between and an 
activity's relationship to the school program and 
accountability; and prepare administrators to be 
held accountable for student well-being when the 
activity is closely related to the purposes and 
program of the sponsoring education institution. 
(6) Provide additional safeguards to insure that 
students are not placed or brought into 
circumstances that are fraught with inherent 
danger. If the potential for danger is known in 
advance, adult students must be apprised of it; and 
parents of non-adult students must be informed of 
it prior to their children's involvement in the 
service-learning experience. 
(7) Educate the service-learning staff to the reality 
that the degree of expected care under the law and 
the degree of required supervision based on age are 
inversely proportional. 
(8) Remember that the location in which a student is 
injured is only one of the factors used in 
determining whether negligence exists and the 
subsequent extent of administrative liability. 189 
In addition to the NASSP suggestions above, others suggest 
that good community relations, proper orientation and training 
188 Responsibilities for Student Injury Occurring Off 
School Property: A Legal Memorandum, Reston, VA: National 
Association of Secondary School Principals, March-April 1975, 
p.6. 
189 Ibid. 
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may be the best ways of diffusing the problem of 
liability. 190 
190 
"Liability: A Growing Concern," The Campus Compact 
Newsletter 4: 4, Spring/Summer 1990 indicating that no lawsuits 
or threats of suits arose from the placement of 20,000 
students with volunteer agencies and attributing this success 
to an "effective, well-regarded program that communicates well 
with students, staff, and the community ... because good will 
goes beyond the legal ramifications of the situation." 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
From this educator's perspective, the legal status of 
service-learners as a designated student group remains 
unclear. However, certain trends are emerging and are likely 
to become more evident as the body of related case law 
expands. This chapter will summarize the findings of the 
research for this paper, draw conclusions based on those 
findings, and make recommendations for future research and 
policy development. 
Secondary Schools 
For secondary school students enrolled in required 
service-learning programs, current case law suggests that 
schools have the right to require service-learning experiences 
as for-credit graduation requirements without infringing on 
students' or parents' Constitutional rights. The determination 
in Steirer91 , though arrived at through incomplete 
reasoning, 192 seems to have settled the Constitutional issues 
191 789 F Supp 1337 (E.D. PA 1992), aff'd, 987 F.2d 989 
(3d Cir.) cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 85 (1993). 
192 See supra n164 discussing the limitations of the 
argument used to arrive at the holding in Steirer. 
91 
92 
at this level of education. 
Also at this time, service-learning requirements which 
are part of the secondary school curriculum create no labor 
law entanglements because of the general acceptance of "in 
loco parentis" status for teachers of children and 
interpretations of the language structures in the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Furthermore, risk managers suggest that concerns 
for liability issues related to service-learning programs may 
be minimized by incorporating risk management plans for these 
programs into existing plans for cooperative, work-study and 
community-based education programs which possess long 
histories of successful risk management in secondary education 
curricula. 
Alternatively, schools could model the procedures and 
policies for service-learning programs after those of the 
aforementioned existing programs or subsume the policies and 
procedures of all experience-based education programs into 
comprehensive new plans using the most successful components 
of the various existing individual plans. 193 Additionally, 
because community service is a recognized curricular strategy 
for developing good citizens, as service-learning programs are 
articulated, the goal for school personnel should be to 
identify methods of protection that complement service rather 
than prohibit it . 194 
193 Independent Sector, "Liability" 3. 
194 4 Campus Compact Newsletter 4:1, Spring/Summer 1990 
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It is generally recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects the right of parents to direct the education of their 
children. However, this right to direct the education of 
offspring has not, 
fundamental right. 
as yet, been clearly designated a 
Because this right is not a fundamental 
right, review of parent claims to direct the education of 
their children is classified under rational basis review 
except where the challenge is premised in religious belief or 
when parents are requesting some degree of control over their 
children's education. These latter conditions both require 
review under strict scrutiny or a balance of parents' and 
state's interests, as noted in Chapel Hill. 195 Under 
rational basis review, a court is only required to determine 
whether a challenged public school requirement for students 
has a valid educational purpose. Worded another way, the 
question becomes, "Is the required service against public 
policy?" 
The value of the service, a policy position, is not at 
issue in this case. The question is whether or not the 
service infringes on student rights to guaranteed protection 
from involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment and 
their rights to free expression as guaranteed under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments along with their parents' rights to 
direct their education. 
195 Appellants Reply Brief at 5, Chapel Hill (No. 95-
2525) . 
94 
While the involuntary servitude concern was addressed by 
the various courts, the analogies used to rationalize court 
positions leave room for reconsideration of the issue. 196 
The free expression concerns were never adequately addressed. 
Yet, the courts in Rye Neck and Chapel Hill accepted the 
holding in Steirer as persuasive authority. In this milieu, a 
key issue for courts should be the reexamination of mandatory 
service programs for secondary school graduation in light of 
previous Supreme Court decisions which interpret protection of 
student rights to free expression. 197 While Steirer closed 
the discussion, it accomplished its task without a sound legal 
argument grounded in Constitutional principles enunciated 
through previous First Amendment decisions by the Supreme 
Court. 
Another issue not addressed by the Steirer court is 
whether or not the requirement was part of the academic 
curriculum of the school. Here the question to be answered 
remains: Is non-compliance with a secondary school service 
requirement for graduation which needs administrative 
approval, receives no faculty direction, is not a course 
requirement, and must be done on the student's own time a 
valid condition for denial of a secondary school diploma? Is 
this a curricular requirement? If it is not, then is the 
196 The analogies used by the courts included mandated 
substance abuse programs, public duty exceptions, required 
community service for criminal offenders. 
197 See supra nn44, 46 - 49 and accompanying text. 
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service really an extra-curricular activity for which credit 
is given? 
By definition extra-curricular means not part of the 
required curriculum. Can a school compel participation in an 
activity which is not part of the curriculum by awarding 
credit for completion of the activity? Can it provide credit 
for completion of that activity which is not part of the 
prescribed curriculum and then deny the right to graduate to 
a student who does not receive credit for completion of that 
activity which is extra-curricular, not part of the required 
curriculum? 
Schools posses the right to establish curriculum and 
graduation requirements within state and/or system frameworks. 
However, the Steirer court never reviewed the manner in which 
the requirement was to be met. Instead it addressed the policy 
issue, the value of the service requirement, which never was 
disputed by the students or their parents. 
Because of the quasi-contractual nature of the 
relationship of students and schools in private secondary 
education, it is likely that courts would recognize the 
school's authority to dismiss students who opposed the 
mandatory service-learning requirement 
cases discussed above. However, even 
as presented in the 
in this arena, the 
fairness of structuring a for-credit graduation requirement to 
be completed on one's own time without faculty direction or 
course relationship remains a valid concern which might 
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trigger a legal issue. 
Higher Education 
Generally the law recognizes higher education students as 
adults . 198 However, this recognition continues to create 
dissonance in the student-university relationship. While most 
courts accept the relationship as contractual, Prosser 
indicates movement in society and the law toward a duty 
relationship between all parties with unequal bargaining 
power. Even where duty, not contract, is the issue, writers 
and commentators acknowledge that courts defer to colleges and 
universities. 199 As a result of this pattern, some students 
do not receive fair treatment in the courts because of their 
unequal bargaining positions relative to institutions of 
higher education. 
While it is generally accepted that the "in loco 
parentis" principle does not apply to adult students, some 
courts apply the principle based on the status of the 
educational institution as college rather than university. 
This pattern of incongruent decisions suggests the student-
198 Rabel v. Ill. Wesleyan University 161 Ill. App. 3d 
348 (1987); Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3rd Cir. 
1979) . 
199 See Victoria J. Dodd, 33 Kan.L.Rev. 702 at 730 
stating, 11 ••• the tort argument as presented in the student's 
case is generally not explored in the opinion, nor is the 
issue ruled upon;" but there is a "growing tendency to impose 
tort liability on schools for failing to properly control 
third parties" in instances of dormitory safety. 
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college/university relationship may require closer analysis to 
define the specific parameters of the relationship before 
formulating generalizations about the legal status of all 
postsecondary service-learners. However, some trends may be 
valid. 
In jurisdictions where contracts of enrollment direct the 
student-institution relationship, contracts between students 
and educational institutions should be clearly articulated so 
that students understand the extent and limits of their 
responsibilities and rights and those that belong to the 
institutions in which they have matriculated. As a general 
rule, contracts in higher education tend to be contracts of 
adhesion200 of which students have limited awareness. 201 
Furthermore, contracts negotiated with community sites on 
behalf of students also should be written and explained to 
students in language that is understandable. 
Where an institutional duty to protect students has been 
recognized, placement sites should be selected with student 
safety as a consideration, 
educational institution 
However, to protect itself, the 
which places the student should 
negotiate to place responsibility for training, supervision, 
and evaluation of the service-learner with the host site. By 
shifting this responsibility from the school to the site, if 
a service-learner is injured in the course of providing 
200 
201 
Id. at 714 - 718. 
Ray, supra n13. 
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service, the characteristics of the employer-employee 
relationship arise out of the student-site relationship rather 
than the school-student relationship. The school merely acts 
as a referral service for the student. 202 Such an 
arrangement limits the potential for legal action against the 
school and its agents while protecting the student in the 
event of injury on the site. 
Education Students 
Authority recognizing student teachers as employees is in 
conflict. 203 Student status in these programs ranges from 
employee of a state university to employee of the school 
district in which the student is placed to undefined. 
Therefore it is important for placement directors and 
receiving school districts and schools to understand the 
limits of protection guaranteed to student teachers in their 
states and to educate these service-learners about the 
parameters of their rights and responsibilities under the laws 
of the state in which they are serving. This is especially 
important in programs which require students to student teach 
in a day school and a residential school before they are 
202 See supra nl85 and accompanying text. 
203 See supra nl32 and accompanying text indicating that 
student teachers placed from state universities in Colorado 
are employees of the state university and when placed in a 
school and injured in the course of their student teaching 
experience are therefore employees; see also supra nl33 
indicating student teachers are employees of the district in 
which they are placed for Workers' Compensation benefits. 
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certified because these students often complete their 
requirements in two different states. 
In Illinois, California and Colorado, student teachers 
usually are protected under Workmen's Compensation Rules in 
the event of injury during a student teaching placement. 
However, students injured during pre-service observation 
periods may or may not be protected under school codes. In 
states where these students are classified as volunteers, 
clinical observation students are protected only to the same 
extent as other volunteers acting in similar situations. 
As a result of case law, pre-service clinical observation 
students in Illinois are classified as volunteers. 204 As 
such, they may be covered under compensation laws if it can be 
shown that at the time of injury the work being done by the 
student arose out of an employment relationship. However, the 
burden of proof rests with the student. If it can be shown 
that the primary benefit of the student's work flows to the. 
school rather than the education student him/herself, the 
school also may be considered the employer; the student then 
may be entitled to worker's compensation. 
When a service-learner, while in the course of a 
university placement in a school, commits a wilful and wanton 
204 See supra n127 and accompanying text which discusses 
an Industrial Commission determination indicating that the 100 
hours of clinical observation performed by an education 
student to complete a state-imposed university requirement did 
not qualify the student for compensation when the student was 
injured in a fall at the school in the course of completing 
those hours. 
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act which results in injury to another or damage to property, 
the limited protection the person is entitled to as a 
volunteer is forfeited under Illinois law (805 ILCS 
105/108.70) If the student is not compensated for the 
service being performed in the school and if the act is not 
wilful and wanton, the student will receive some protection 
under the law. However, if this same service-learner provides 
service to a park district sports team instead of a school, 
(s)he may receive compensation for reasonable expenses or a 
modest honorarium for services as a referee or umpire (745 
ILCS 80/1) and remain classified as a volunteer under the law. 
If this same volunteer furnishes medical services in a free 
clinic, ( s) he must be licensed to provide medical care to 
humans. Additionally, the lawful limits on liability for this 
volunteer must be posted at the clinical site. If they are 
not posted, they do not apply (225 ILCS 60/31). 
Considering the above distinctions which apply to 
service-learners in volunteer roles in Illinois, institutions 
of higher education which place students in required service-
learning situations should be aware of the circumstances and 
contexts in which the students are volunteering. Even though 
persons responsible for identifying or approving service-
learning placements for students may consider all volunteer 
positions analogous, the previously enumerated statutes 
indicate that in Illinois, at least these three types of 
service-learners are treated differently under the law. 
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volunteer statutes may Lack 
jeopardize 
of familiarity 
the security 
with 
of student service-learners, 
educational institutions, and placement sites or their clients 
in the event of injury or damage to property. Depending on 
the language and structure of statues related to volunteers, 
this also may be true in other states. Therefore a systematic 
review of these statutes and their interpretations on a state-
by-state basis may be necessary to clarify the roles of 
service-learners classified as volunteers. 
Also, classification of students as volunteers does not 
mean the law will view them as non-employees. As noted in 
Barragan v. Worker's Compensation Board, 2 4 0 Cal Rpt r 811 
(1987), students who are injured in the course of degree-
required internships may be employees under the law if the 
service is rewarded by training and instruction, the service 
site directs the activities of the students and accords the 
students the same treatment as other employees, and no 
exclusions for students exist under state statute. 
Medical Students 
The legal arena for service-learners classified as 
interns and residents is equally complex. In California for 
example, medical residents may be simultaneously students and 
employees. 205 This may be true in other states, too. 
Depending on the terms of their enrollment, students in 
205 See supra n145 and accompanying text. 
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nursing programs may or may not be employees within 
compensation acts. 206 However, medical technician trainees 
and nurse's aide trainees who receive uncompensated training 
in hospitals usually are considered non-employees. Therefore, 
these service-learners usually are classified as students for 
purposes of insurance, compensation and liability. While most 
case law focuses on issues of control and supervision, 207 
analyses of who benefits most from the work of the medical 
service-learners could amplify understanding of the 
distinctions between service-learners who are employees and 
service-learners classified as non-employees. 208 
Liability 
For purposes of liability based on negligence, the law 
requires all actors to respond in a manner consistent with 
persons of the same age in similar circumstances and similar 
contexts. (The only exception may be very young children.) 
Central to liability premised on negligence is the principle 
206 
207 
See supra nn137 - 147 and accompanying text. 
Id. 
208 Analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, if one considers that various aspects of 
hospital activities are run solely by residents and interns, 
it is obvious that the organization receives an important 
economic benefit from the work of these service-learners. 
Whereas the activities performed by service-learners as 
technicians and aides usually provides greater benefit to the 
students than to the hospital because these service-learners 
generally do not function in isolation and usually do not 
possess decision-making authority as do residents. 
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that the legal burden on students increases in proportion to 
their age and experience. This principle is demonstrated in 
the legal cases cited involving skill acquisition by 
vocational students209 and should be made known to all 
service-learners. 
For teachers and administrators it is important to 
realize that although statutory law in each state is unique, 
determination of negligence always is a question for a jury; 
it is not a matter of law for a judge to decide. 210 
Furthermore, the level of culpability in a negligence suit is 
to be determined by the court; it is not a statement of 
fact. 211 
It is generally agreed that teachers are not insurers of 
student safety. Case law exists supporting this principle for 
service-learning programs in secondary schools212 and 
postsecondary schools. 213 
What is important to bear in mind is that teachers at all 
levels of education are responsible for supervision of their 
students. 
level of 
209 
However, as the age of the students increases, the 
supervision expected of the teachers diminishes. 
See supra nn58 - 88 and accompanying text. 
210 Hackathorne v. Preisse, 661 N.E.2d 384 (Ohio App. 9 
Dist. 1995). 
211 Id. where this is explicated under Ohio law. 
212 See supra nn6 O 77, 80 83 t 85 88 and 
accompanying texts. 
213 See supra nn78, 79, 84 and accompanying texts. 
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When students are adults, courts expect that they will be able 
to follow certain types of directions given by an instructor 
without the instructor's direct supervision. 2 ~ This 
concept has important ramifications for higher education. It 
may limit teacher culpability when direct supervision is not 
provided to a service-learner if evidence supports a finding 
that directions were given prior to the placement. 
Where inadequate supervision of service-learners in skill 
acquisition placements may expose schools to tort liability, 
it is important for institutions and students to recognize 
that such liability may be limited by a scope of duties which 
are narrowly defined. Also, such liability may be highly 
subjective. The essential concern for administrators should 
be to prudently oversee the development, design, and 
administration of a school's service-learning curriculum and 
to provide appropriate training and supervision for faculty or 
staff who bear responsibility for the program. 
Where liability under respondeat superior is at issue, 
case law exists suggesting that secondary schools and 
college/universities may have the law on their side. In 
Illinois a vocational education teacher's control over 
students who may be considered service-learners is not the 
same as an employer's control over an employee. 215 Further 
2
~ Levine v. Live Oak Masonic Housing, Inc. 491 So.2d 
489 (La.App.3 Cir. 1986) 
215 Knapp v. Hill, 627 N.E.2d 1068 ( I 11 . App . 1st 
Dist.1995) 
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research is necessary to determine if this is true in other 
states also. 
In California a student-athlete is not considered an 
employee of his/her institution of higher education. 216 
While this case is not on-point, the clearly articulated 
reasoning of the court indicates the role of public policy in 
court decisions and suggests that court decisions arising out 
of service-learning also may be resolved in favor of 
institutions. As the Townsend court stated, "From the 
standpoint of public policy consideration, exposing [private 
and public institutions of higher education] to vicarious 
liability for torts committed in athletic competition would 
create a severe drain on the State's precious education 
resources." Using this statement as persuasive authority, a 
court, one day, might reason that service-learners also should 
not be considered employees of their colleges\universities. 
In the 1970s cooperative education and work-study 
programs were advised to negotiate agreements that place 
training, supervision, control and evaluation of these 
students with the host site to avoid the labor law 
entanglements that could arise as a result of student 
placements in states outside the state in which the 
216 Townsend v. State, 237 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. App. 2 
Dist. 1987). 
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educational ins ti tut ion is situated. 217 This remains prudent 
advice even today. 
However, the caveat that placing ins ti tut ions should 
ascertain the safety of placement sites must not be 
overlooked. 
community 
Additionally risk managers recommend good 
relations, adequate insurance coverage and 
appropriate staff training and evaluation as key components in 
a program designed to limit potential risks for organizations 
and their service-learners. As at the secondary level, 
rulings affecting traditional cooperative education, work-
study and pro-bono placements which are required for four year 
degree-seeking students also suggest addressing the potential 
liability concerns under existing program policies and 
procedures which already have taken into account potential 
programmatic risks. 
While risk managers continue to suggest increasing 
insurance coverage to protect institutions and students, a 
cost-benefit analysis may generate some new insights into the 
effect of increased insurance coverage for students and 
institutions involved in service-learning programs which may 
include but are not limited to experience-based programs in 
career development, academic knowledge, skill development or 
some combination for which students may or may not be 
compensated. Finally, as in secondary education, the goal of 
217 See supra n185 and accompanying text discussing this 
point in the context of Wuerffel v. Westinghouse Corporation, 
148 N.J.Super. 327, 372 A.2d 659. 
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any risk management plan related to service-learning in higher 
education should be identification of protection methods that 
complement service-learning which has been verified as a 
legitimate curriculum strategy to foster good citizenship. 
For the time being, the legal status of service-learning 
is settled at the secondary level; concerns continue to exist 
at the college/university level. At both levels, liability 
based in negligence and the level of culpability will be 
determined by the reasonable person standard which compares 
the behavior of the tortfeasor to a person of the same age, in 
a similar circumstance and context. Employee status for 
worker's compensation benefits generally is determined by 
state codes; but assignment of vicarious liability under 
respondea t superior will probably be directed by public 
policy. Finally for purposes of risk management, inclusion of 
service-learners in institutional insurance policies is 
advisable. 
Recommendations 
1. Include the community stakeholders in the development of 
service-learning policies which clearly delineate the 
mission, vision, and goals of the programs. 
2. Provide site-specific training for school personnel who 
have supervisory responsibility at sites. 
3. 
4. 
Document all training and evaluation. 
Develop, distribute, and adhere to policies and 
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procedures articulated in program-specific handbooks. 
5. Review and update handbooks regularly. 
6. Negotiate to transfer responsibility for training, 
supervision and evaluation of service-learners from the 
sending institution to the receiving institution. 
7. Develop a list of acceptable placements and allow 
students to select their own placements. 
8. Inform students and program personnel of applicable laws 
(state school codes; state workers' compensation and 
volunteer statutes; and federal labor and wage/hour laws) 
9. Inform service-learners of their status as volunteers or 
employees whenever it is known. 
10. Be sure your volunteers are respected as volunteers and 
not allowed to replace employees or function at the same 
level as site employees unless the volunteer activity as 
implemented is specifically protected under the law. 
10. Remember that you and your institution may be vicariously 
liable for the negligence of a service-learner under 
respondeat superior if your institution shares training, 
supervisory, and evaluatory responsibilities with a host 
site. 
11. Include all service-learners and related personnel under 
your instituion's liability insurance policy. 
12. Develop good community relations which include fostering 
awareness of the mission, vision, and goals of your 
service-learning program. 
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